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What’s the Deal with Revlon?
ZACHARY J. GUBLER*
Under the Revlon doctrine, courts are to apply a higher level of scrutiny in certain
takeover situations in an attempt to control potential conflicts of interest that might
prejudice target shareholders. However, the doctrine has always had sufficient “play
in the joints” that one might reasonably wonder whether it has much of an effect in
practice on short-term shareholder returns. Additionally, in recent years, the trend
in Delaware’s Revlon jurisprudence seems to be to defer to the target board as long
as there are no glaring conflicts of interest. Taken together, these facts raise concern
over the continued relevance of the Revlon doctrine.
It turns out this concern is justified. In this Article, I present evidence that Revlon
has a significant effect on the type of sales process that target boards adopt—when
in Revlon mode, they pursue active market checks with greater frequency, engage
with more potential bidders and receive more bids. However, this difference in
process has no discernible effect on shareholder returns, whether measured as
abnormal market returns upon deal announcement or deal premia. And yet, there is
still evidence, in this study and others, that conflicts of interest abound.
In other words, the modern incarnation of Revlon no long appears up to the task
for which it was intended. Consequently, I argue that courts should reorient the
doctrine around a robust review of the types of conflicts of interest that might
actually harm target shareholders. Additionally, if as the Delaware Supreme Court
has indicated, target shareholders might ratify the types of problems Revlon was
intended to address through the mandatory statutory merger vote requirement, it will
be necessary to adopt additional securities disclosure rules to provide shareholders
with sufficient information to make an informed ratification decision.
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INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2011, BHP Billiton and Petrohawk Energy Corporation agreed
to merge.1 BHP, one of the world’s largest mining companies, was at the time a
gorilla of the industry with a market cap of over $100 billion. Petrohawk, by
contrast, was a pygmy-sized player with a market cap of only $7 billion, and yet it
owned the rights to some of the most important “shale plays”2 in the world. For
this reason, BHP viewed the transaction as giving it “greater exposure to the
world’s largest energy market, while also broadening [its] geographic and customer
spread.”3 BHP agreed to pay $38.75 per share in cash, which valued
Petrohawk’s equity at about $12 billion.4 This price represented a premium of
62% over the prevailing market price on the day prior to the deal’s
announcement.5 Perhaps not surprisingly, given this premium, the market cheered
the transaction. Upon deal announcement, Petrohawk’s stock jumped by about 60%
while BHP’s was essentially unaffected.6
The price that BHP paid was not the result of a competitive bidding process.
Petrohawk did not actively solicit any other bidders for the company, and in fact, it
was barred from doing so by a month-long exclusivity agreement.7 During that
exclusivity period, no unsolicited bids emerged, and Petrohawk was able to increase
BHP’s original bid of $37.50 by only 3%.8 The deal was structured as a two-step
merger consisting of a tender offer for all Petrohawk shares, followed by a merger
that would extinguish the remaining shares.9 Under the merger agreement,
Petrohawk was prohibited from actively soliciting any additional bids between the
time of signing and closing,10 a period that ended up lasting only one month.11
Nevertheless, the agreement contained a standard fiduciary out, which would allow
the Petrohawk board under certain circumstances to withdraw or change its
1. BHP Billiton and Petrohawk Energy Corporation Announce Merger Agreement,
BHP (July 15, 2011, 10:00 AM), https://www.bhp.com/media-and-insights/newsreleases/2011/07/bhp-billiton-and-petrohawk-energy-corporation-announce-mergeragreement [https://perma.cc/N7B8-Z7LK].
2. The term “shale play” refers to shale formations containing accumulations of natural
gas. See Shale Gas Glossary, DEP’T ENERGY, https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/04
/f0/shale_gas_glossary.pdf [https://perma.cc/KQX4-UZLX].
3. BHP Billiton and Petrohawk Energy Corporation Announce Merger Agreement,
supra note 1.
4. Id.
5. This data is from Thomson Reuters’ SDC Platinum Database. SDC Platinum,
THOMSON REUTERS, http://financial.thomsonreuters.com/en/products/data-analytics/marketdata/sdc-platinum-financial-securities.html [https://perma.cc/7XW3-RZTU].
6. See id.
7. Petrohawk Energy Corp., Offer to Purchase (Exhibit 99A.1.A to Schedule TO), at 27
(July 25, 2011) [hereinafter “Offer to Purchase”].
8. See id. at 27–28.
9. See id. at 11–13.
10. See id. at 38–39.
11. BHP Billiton Completes Acquisition of Petrohawk Energy Corporation, BHP (Aug.
26, 2011, 10:00 AM), https://www.bhp.com/media-and-insights/news-releases/2011/08/bhp
-billiton-completes-acquisition-of-petrohawk-energy-corporation [https://perma.cc/P7EV
-L9AM].
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recommendation that the shareholders tender their shares.12 Additionally, under the
deal, Floyd Wilson, Petrohawk’s sixty-three year old chief executive officer (CEO)
and chairman of the board who negotiated the deal with BHP, was to receive $5
million in consulting fees for a six-month period following the closing of the deal.13
These consulting fees represented about 142% of the cash portion of Wilson’s salary
for the entire prior year when he was serving as CEO of the company.14
Under Delaware law, a deal like the one between BHP and Petrohawk warrants
what is referred to as Revlon scrutiny, a more searching form of judicial scrutiny than
the extremely deferential business judgment review that typically applies to a board’s
business decisions.15 Originally adopted by the Delaware Supreme Court in the case
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,16 the Revlon doctrine was
meant to “prevent the conflicts of interest that arise in the field of mergers and
acquisitions by demanding that directors act with scrupulous concern for fairness to
shareholders.”17 For example, the $5 million in consulting fees paid to Wilson might
accurately reflect the value BHP placed on possibly the most knowledgeable person
on the planet on all matters related to Petrohawk’s operations. On the other hand, it
might simply represent a payoff in an effort to persuade Wilson to prevail upon the
Petrohawk board to select BHP as a merger partner and forgo any active solicitation
that might generate even higher bids.
Revlon’s solution to this conflict of interest problem was to require target boards,
in certain takeover situations, to act as “auctioneers” tasked with getting “the best
price for the stockholders.”18 Initially, this auctioneering duty implied adopting a
process that typically would entail an active solicitation of bids either before or after
signing a merger agreement with an acquiror.19 The original rhetoric also implied
that in sorting among reasonably similar bids, the target was to select the deal with
the highest price.20
Despite these early aspirations of the Revlon doctrine, over time the Delaware
courts relaxed the doctrine, holding that target firms in Revlon mode do not actually
have to accept the highest bid. More recently, the Delaware Supreme Court has
signaled a willingness to defer to target boards in Revlon mode, provided that there

12. See Offer to Purchase, supra note 7, at 39–40.
13. See id. at 48; see also Petrohawk Energy Corp., Executive Retention Agreement
(Form 8-K, Exhibit 10.1), at 2–3 (July 20, 2011); Petrohawk Energy Corp., Consulting
Agreement (Form 8-K, Attachment 1), at 2 (July 20, 2011).
14. See Petrohawk Energy Corp., Proxy Statement (Form DEF 14A), at 42 (Apr. 16,
2011).
15. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N. MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS COMM., MODEL MERGER
AGREEMENT FOR THE ACQUISITION OF A PUBLIC COMPANY, at xxiv (2011) (comparing the
business judgment rule and the Revlon standard of review).
16. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
17. Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989).
18. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
19. Barkan, 567 A.2d at 1287 (“When the board is considering a single offer and has no
reliable grounds upon which to judge its adequacy, this concern for fairness demands a canvas
of the market to determine if higher bids may be elicited.”).
20. In Revlon itself, the focus was on the “best price.” See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182. It was
not until almost a decade later that the Delaware Supreme Court started talking about the “best
value.” See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 44 (Del. 1994).
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are no glaring conflicts of interest.21 Under the modern incarnation of Revlon
jurisprudence, the consulting fee in the BHP-Petrohawk deal likely would not count
as a conflict of interest. Instead, the courts appear to be looking for boards that do
not consist of a majority of outside directors or where there is an obvious bias in
favor of the winning bidder.22
For these reasons, there is a real possibility that the Revlon doctrine no longer
does what it set out to do, which is to maximize short-term shareholder returns. That
is not to say that target boards in Revlon mode no longer adopt what is at least on its
face a more competitive sales process. That seems unlikely because of a combination
of path dependence23 and the strong norms that favor such process.24 However, based
on the increasingly deferential approach of the Revlon jurisprudence, it might be that
such process simply fails to make a difference for shareholders. On the other hand,
there is a robust finding in the mergers and acquisitions literature that cash
consideration is highly positively correlated with measures of shareholder returns,
including, for example, abnormal market returns upon deal announcement and
merger premia.25 Since cash consideration is one of the things that triggers Revlon
scrutiny,26 it is at least plausible that these studies are picking up, in part, the effect
that a Revlon influenced process has on such measures of shareholder gains.
This Article attempts to sort out these issues. The Article seeks to test the
continued relevance of Revlon by considering its effect on the sales process of those
companies that find themselves in Revlon mode as well as the effect of this process
on measures of short-term shareholder return, in particular, abnormal market returns
upon deal announcement and merger premia. I present evidence that Revlon does
indeed affect deal process—it is associated with a higher incidence of active
solicitations of bidders (so-called “active market checks”), a greater number of
contacts with potential bidders, and a greater number of bids.27 However, these dealprocess variables are not associated with higher short-term shareholder returns.28
In other words, the data presented here confirms what one might conclude based
on a review of Revlon’s modern turn toward increasing board deference—Revlon no
longer leads to greater shareholder returns, if it ever did. Revlon’s focus on process
has ultimately affected the deal process, but not in a way that actually meaningfully
benefits shareholders. The Article concludes with a policy proposal: that the courts
re-emphasize the importance of an active sales process in their Revlon jurisprudence
while at the same time applying a higher level of scrutiny to the types of conflicts of

21. See infra notes 174–88 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 174–88 and accompanying text.
23. For a general sense of theories of path dependence, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark
J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L.
REV. 127 (1999).
24. Cf. Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?,
44 UCLA L. REV. 1009 (1997) (arguing that Delaware law creates social norms for directors
and officers).
25. See infra notes 124–28 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 87–93 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 138–43 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 143–49 and accompanying text.
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interest that motivated the Revlon inquiry in the first place.29 Additionally, the Article
considers Delaware’s recent endorsement of the shareholder vote as a way to address
the conflict of interest concerns underlying Revlon.30 It argues that the current
securities disclosure environment is unequipped for this task, and it proposes several
disclosure rules that would be required to make such shareholder ratification work
effectively.31
The Article proceeds as follows: In Part I, I discuss the origins of Revlon and its
modern incarnation. In Part II, I conduct an empirical analysis of the effect of Revlon
on deal process and shareholder returns. In Part III, I discuss the policy implications
of the results presented in Part II.
I. THE REVLON DOCTRINE: ITS ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION
Revlon32 was a watershed moment in the development of Delaware corporate law
because it was the first time that the Delaware courts articulated a unique standard
of review for evaluating takeovers.33 The case involved Ronald Perelman, a
swashbuckling investor who had accumulated a profitable group of companies,
including a mid-level jewelry store and a regional supermarket chain. The CEO of
Revlon, a sophisticated Frenchman named Michel Bergerac, did not feel for
Perelman’s company, Pantry Pride, the same affection that Perelman reserved for
Revlon. Nor did Bergerac seem to like Perelman himself all that much, which
probably explains why he consistently rebuffed his advances.34 After several
unsuccessful overtures, Perelman finally made a hostile cash tender offer for Revlon
at successively increasing prices.35 The deal was to be financed with a combination
of junk bonds along with the proceeds from the sale of various key Revlon assets.
Thus, under Perelman’s plan, Revlon was to be broken up.
In response, on the advice of Marty Lipton, the famed mergers and acquisitions
(M&A) advisor and Revlon’s legal counsel, Revlon adopted a number of
antitakeover defenses, including a poison pill.36 But they also sought out a “white
knight” in the form of Ted Forstmann, a respected Wall Street financier and the head
of the private equity firm, Forstmann, Little & Company.37 The deal Revlon struck
with Forstmann was for cash at a price that was only slightly higher than Perelman’s
outstanding bid (and lower than Perelman’s ultimate bid) and included a no-shop
provision as well as a lock-up option on various valuable Revlon assets at a bargain

29. See infra notes 166–87 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 188–97 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 188–97 and accompanying text.
32. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
33. Some might say that the origins of Revlon can actually be found in the Smith v. Van
Gorkom case, which was decided the year before Revlon. See generally 488 A.2d 858 (Del.
1985) (holding that a target board that spent no more than a few hours considering a takeover
bid negotiated by a retiring CEO who offered a price that was accepted without a counteroffer
was grossly negligent in violation of its duty of care).
34. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 176.
35. See id. at 177–78.
36. See id. at 180–81.
37. See id. at 178, 183–84.
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basement price.38 Forstmann also agreed to issue promissory notes in exchange for
certain Revlon-issued notes whose holders had been threatening to sue the Revlon
board ever since the notes had suffered a significant drop in value due to the board’s
waiver of an important restrictive covenant.39 Finally, the deal with Forstmann would
require Revlon to sell off several operating divisions.40
Perelman sued and was awarded a preliminary injunction by the Chancery Court,
which was upheld on appeal by the Delaware Supreme Court.41 The problem was not
so much the deal protection devices that Revlon initially adopted to ward off
Perelman’s unwanted bid. Those devices were permissible under the proportionality
review established in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.42 Rather, the problem had
to do with the no-shop and lock-up provisions that Revlon had granted Forstmann
Little.43 In the court’s view, those provisions effectively ended bidding for Revlon
since Perelman could not compete with those agreements in place.44 The court
thought that cutting off bidding was particularly problematic in a situation like
Revlon’s where it was inevitable that the company was going to be broken up (since
both Perelman’s and Forstman’s financing plans required selling off certain key
Revlon assets).45 In that context, the court determined that “[t]he directors’ role
changed from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting
the best price for the stockholders at a sale of the company.”46
The Revlon opinion introduced a new standard of review, sometimes called
enhanced scrutiny, that is applicable in the takeover context. This standard requires
“(a) a judicial determination regarding the adequacy of the decision making process
employed by the directors, including the information on which the directors based
their decision; and (b) a judicial examination of the reasonableness of the directors’
action in light of the circumstances then existing.”47 Thus, under Revlon review,
directors bear the burden of showing that they are “adequately informed and acted
reasonably,” but they are not required to show that they made a perfect decision, only
a reasonable one.48
Not long after Revlon was decided, it became clear that Revlon duties apply not
only to situations like Revlon where there are multiple bidders vying for the same
target but also to situations where there is a single bidder. For example, just three
years after Revlon, the Delaware Supreme Court decided Barkan v. Amsted

38. See id. at 178–79.
39. Id. at 178–79. The covenant prohibited the company from incurring debt or selling
assets going forward and was meant as a means of warding off Perelman. See id. at 177.
40. Id. at 178–79.
41. Id. at 185.
42. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). Under Unocal, an anti-takeover mechanism was
permissible as long as there was a legitimate threat to the corporation and the response (i.e.
the anti-takeover mechanism) was proportionate to that threat. Id. at 955.
43. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 183–84.
44. See id. at 184–85.
45. See id. at 182.
46. Id. at 182.
47. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45 (Del. 1994).
48. Id.
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Industries, Inc.,49 a case involving a management-led buyout of Amsted.50 The
plaintiff shareholders argued the Amsted board breached its duties under Revlon by
agreeing to the management-led buyout without attempting to solicit any other bids
and with no way of knowing whether the price that management was offering was
the best they could get consistent with their obligation to act as auctioneers.51 The
Delaware Supreme Court disagreed that the board had breached its duties. They
recognized that:
When the board is considering a single offer and has no reliable grounds
upon which to judge its adequacy, this concern for fairness [underlying
Revlon] demands a canvas of the market to determine if higher bids may
be elicited. When, however, the directors possess a body of reliable
evidence with which to evaluate the fairness of a transaction, they may
approve that transaction without conducting an active survey of the
market.52
In the case of the management buyout of Amsted, no other bidder had emerged in
the ten months between signing and closing.53 Additionally, the price reflected
certain tax advantages that were unlikely to accrue to any bidder other than
management, and therefore the board had reason to believe that it was likely the best
price they could get.54
The Barkan case did a good job illustrating the potential scope of Revlon—that it
applies potentially to every merger, not just ones involving competing bids—but the
same year the Barkan case was decided, the Delaware Supreme Court issued yet
another Revlon opinion that hinted at the doctrine’s limits. In Paramount
Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.,55 the issue was whether the Time board had
breached its Revlon duties when, in an effort to prevent Paramount from breaking up
its merger of equals with Warner Bros., Time altered the structure of the deal with
Warner to avoid a shareholder vote by Time shareholders.56 Paramount and certain
Time shareholders brought an action seeking to enjoin the Time-Warner transaction,
alleging, among other things, that Revlon required the Time board to seek the best
price for the company’s shareholders.57 In other words, the Time board could not
simply reject Paramount’s bid.58

49. 567 A.2d 1279 (Del. 1989).
50. See id. at 1281.
51. See id.
52. Id. at 1287 (citations omitted).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
56. The original deal between Time and Warner was structured as a stock-for-stock
merger of equals under which Time’s issuance of stock in connection with the merger would
trigger voting rights on the part of its shareholder pursuant to the rules of the New York Stock
Exchange. Time subsequently modified the deal so that Time would acquire Warner in an allcash merger financed by debt, a structure that would not require approval by Time
shareholders. See id. at 1146–49.
57. See id. at 1142.
58. See id.
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However, the Delaware Supreme Court denied the requested preliminary
injunction on the ground that Revlon had not been triggered for the Time board. In
doing so, it affirmed the chancery court’s decision, although it did so for different
reasons.59 The chancery court had held that Revlon required a change of control,60
but the original Time-Warner merger did not constitute a change of control because
Time did not have a controlling shareholder before it signed its deal with Warner,
and it would not have one after.61 Rather, “control of the corporation existed in a
fluid aggregation of unaffiliated shareholders representing a voting majority—in
other words, in the market.”62 Recognizing that the chancery court’s conclusion was
supported by the record and correct as a matter of law, the Delaware Supreme Court
nevertheless premised its decision on different grounds, “namely, the absence of any
substantial evidence to conclude that Time’s board, in negotiating with Warner,
made the dissolution or breakup of the corporate entity inevitable, as was the case in
Revlon.”63
Thus, whereas Barkan suggested a highly capacious scope for Revlon, Time
suggested a more limited one. Additionally, while Revlon itself suggested demanding
auctioneering duties, the Barkan case suggested something comparatively less so.
These cases, while only the tip of the Revlon iceberg, do a good job illustrating the
variable nature of the doctrine. They also reflect the two overarching questions
raised, and still not entirely resolved, by the Revlon inquiry: (1) when does Revlon
apply? and (2) what does Revlon require? I explore these questions in greater detail
below.
A. When Does Revlon Apply?
Surveying its takeover jurisprudence nearly eight years after the Revlon decision,
the Delaware Supreme Court identified three scenarios where Revlon duties apply.64
First, they apply “when a corporation initiates an active bidding process seeking to
sell itself or to effect a business reorganization involving a clear breakup of the
company.”65 Second, they apply “where, in response to a bidder’s offer, a target
abandons its long-term strategy and seeks an alternative transaction involving the
breakup of the company.”66 Third, they apply “when approval of a transaction results
in a sale or change of control.”67
Why these triggers? What is the animating principle behind them? The best
answer is that they have to do with conflicts of interest. This is, after all, the concern
of the Unocal test, which applies to a company’s anti-takeover related response to a

59. See id. at 1150.
60. See Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. Time Inc., Nos. 10866, 10670, and 10935, 1989
WL 79880, at *23 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989).
61. Id. at *21.
62. Id. at *16.
63. Time, 571 A.2d at 1150.
64. Arnold v. Soc’y for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1289–90 (Del. 1994).
65. Id. at 1290 (quoting Time, 571 A.2d at 1150).
66. Id. (quoting Time, 571 A.2d at 1150).
67. Id. (quoting Paramount Commc’ns Inc., v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42–43,
47 (Del. 1994)).
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perceived threat and which the Delaware Supreme Court views, along with Revlon,
as part of a unified field of inquiry.68 Additionally, the view that Revlon is primarily
concerned with conflicts of interest is one shared by scholars,69 as well as several
federal courts who so opine when called upon to apply Revlon or related doctrines.70
Of course, conflicts of interest are a perennial issue in corporate law. Why should
they be of particular concern in the takeover context? The answer is because they are
ubiquitous and, in some ways, unavoidable in the takeover context. Consider two
different examples: In Example 1, Acquiror A might want to keep Target CEO in the
same position following the transaction and perhaps even elevate him to the board of
the combined company, a more prestigious position than his current membership on
the Target board. Acquiror B, by contrast, might plan to terminate CEO’s
employment as soon as the deal is closed. However, maybe Acquiror B values Target
higher than Acquiror A because of greater synergies and is therefore offering a higher
price for Target. Can we really trust the CEO to make the right decision here for the
shareholders? If he prevails upon the board to accept Acquiror A’s offer, when
Acquiror B would put Target’s assets to a higher use, then this would be inefficient
from society’s perspective. In Example 2, by contrast, maybe Target CEO prevails
upon the board to accept Acquiror B’s offer, thus avoiding the inefficient outcome,
but this time because Acquiror B offers Target CEO a lucrative “transaction bonus,”
Target CEO does not negotiate as hard as he otherwise would, thereby leaving money
on the table for the Target shareholders. This scenario would raise a distributional
question as opposed to an efficiency one.
To be sure, we could complicate things further by adding facts that make it less
clear Target should accept Acquiror B’s offer in Example 1. For example, maybe
Acquiror B is offering a higher price but there is greater uncertainty as to whether
the deal with Acquiror B will close because of more complicated regulatory or
antitrust issues. Or maybe it is not so obvious that the transaction bonus that Acquiror
B offers Target CEO in Example 2 is a bad thing. For example, maybe the bonus is
necessary to get Target CEO to relinquish his position, along with all of the status
and perks that go along with it. But for now, let us stick with the more simplistic
version of these scenarios where the conflict of interest leads to a sale that is not

68. “[T]he general principles announced in Revlon, in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum
Co., and in Moran v. Household International, Inc. govern this case and every case in which
a fundamental change of corporate control occurs or is contemplated.” QVC, 637 A.2d at 46
(quoting Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989)) (emphasis omitted)
(citations omitted).
69. See, e.g., MICHAEL P. DOOLEY, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATION LAW 577 (1995);
Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Geography of Revlon-Land, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3277, 3281
(2013). But see Mohsen Manesh, Defined by Dictum: The Geography of Revlon-Land in Cash
and Mixed Consideration Transactions, 59 VILL. L. REV. 1, 27–28 (2014) (arguing that Revlon
is animated by a mishmash of policy concerns that go well beyond the simple potential for
conflicts of interest).
70. See, e.g., Southdown, Inc. v. Moore McCormack Res., Inc., 686 F. Supp. 595, 602
(S.D. Tex. 1988) (describing the related Unocal standard as asking “whether a fully informed,
wholly disinterested, reasonably courageous director would dissent from the board’s act in any
material part”).
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shareholder value maximizing, either of the inefficient or efficient variety. Are these
actually problems?
There are two different arguments that are sometimes deployed in this context to
suggest that in most cases, the answer to this question is “no,” these are not actually
problems. First, one might argue that if conflicts of interest lead to an inefficient sale,
as in Example 1, this is not really a serious concern because another acquiror will
come along and recognizing these inefficiencies, will acquire the combined company
and correct the problem. In other words, the argument is that the market for corporate
control will solve the inefficient sale problem. Accordingly, some commentators
suggest that maybe Revlon should only focus on situations where the market for
corporate control cannot be expected to work as well.71
Second, one might argue that if conflicts of interest end up shortchanging Target
shareholders, leaving money on the negotiation table, this really should be of little
concern since diversified shareholders are just as likely to be invested in the Acquiror
as the Target (and possibly both) and that therefore the relative gains and losses will
average out over time. Armed with this argument, commentators argue that Revlon
should therefore focus on situations where diversified shareholders cannot be
expected to invest in the acquiror—for example, where the acquiror’s stock is not
publicly traded.72
These arguments are not without their problems. The market for corporate control
is hardly the laissez-faire ideal imagined in these arguments, particularly now that
Unocal review has basically devolved into business judgment review.73 Nor is it
entirely clear why we should privilege the hypothetical diversified investor,
particularly in corporate law where, unlike in the securities law context, we are
focused on particular corporations with a particular shareholder base. But perhaps
the biggest problem with these arguments is that they describe a world that could not
be more different from the way corporate law actually works in practice.
For example, let us say that the Board of X Corp., beholden for various reasons
to the domineering Chairman, agrees to hire the Chairman’s family members in a
number of executive positions for which they are wholly unqualified and enters into
extravagantly generous employment agreements with them. It is certainly true that
the market for corporate control could theoretically address that problem if Y Corp.
were to acquire X Corp., oust the Chairman, his cronies on the Board, and his family
members and replace them with competent people who work for no more than the
market rate. But this possibility would not prevent a court from applying the entire
fairness test to determine, most likely, that the CEO violated his duty of loyalty in
the absence of approval by a disinterested board or shareholders.74

71. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 69, at 3292–93.
72. E.g., id. at 3310–11.
73. See, e.g., James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Delaware’s Retreat: Exploring
Developing Fissures and Tectonic Shifts in Delaware Corporate Law, 42 DEL. J. CORP. L. 323,
384 (2018) (“The Delaware Supreme Court’s movement of Unocal in the direction of the
traditional deferential business judgment rule . . . .”).
74. “Entire fairness, Delaware’s most onerous standard, applies when the board labors
under actual conflicts of interest. Once entire fairness applies, the defendants must establish
‘to the court’s satisfaction that the transaction was the product of both fair dealing and fair
price.’” In re Trados Inc. S’holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 44 (Del. Ch. 2013) (emphasis in original)
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Similarly, what if the Board of Alpha Inc. enters into various contracts with Beta
Inc., a company that was founded by a majority of the Alpha board, who still owns
a significant share of Beta, and the contracts they negotiate are extraordinarily
favorable to Beta?75 From the perspective of the diversified shareholder, this should
not matter because it is just as statistically likely for that shareholder to be an owner
of the Alphas of the world as it is the Betas of the world and therefore the losses and
gains will average out over time. But even though this is true, that will not prevent a
judge from analyzing the transaction under the entire fairness test and, most likely,
determine that the Alpha directors breached their fiduciary duties.
In other words, Delaware corporate law does not follow the logic of these
economic arguments in any other context involving conflicts of interest. In no other
context does it allow the possibility of the salutary effect of market forces eliminate
the need for judicial review of conflicted transactions. Why this is so is beyond the
scope of this Article, although one can speculate as to the reasons.76 The point,
however, is that if these arguments do not generally do any work in other areas of
Delaware corporate law, it is not clear why they should do so in the takeover context.
Thus, to reiterate, Revlon appears to be primarily about conflicts of interest, and
Revlon’s solution is to require the target board in takeover situations to be laser
focused on maximizing the short-term equity value of the corporation. But if this is
so, then how do we explain the three Revlon triggers mentioned previously, focused
as they seem to be on corporate breakups and control transactions? The answer, I
think, has to do with the fact that every sale of a company has the potential to be
influenced by conflicts of interest. Yet, clearly, the Delaware Supreme Court did not
want Revlon to swallow up all of takeover law, as evidenced by its attempt to cabin
its applicability in cases like Time.77 For this reason, the Revlon triggers seem to
identify situations where it is reasonable to assume that (1) the risk of conflicts is
particularly high or (2) the potential costs of not policing for conflicts are particularly
high.
It is perhaps easiest to see this point in the context of the control transaction
trigger, the third trigger identified above. A control transaction in this context is

(quoting Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1163 (Del. 1995)). “Not even an
honest belief that the transaction was entirely fair will be sufficient to establish entire fairness.
Rather, the transaction itself must be objectively fair, independent of the board’s beliefs.” Id.
(quoting Gesoff v. IIC Indus., Inc., 902 A.2d 1130, 1145 (Del. Ch. 2006)).
75. Cf. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971) (holding that a corporation
that manages a contract between its wholly owned subsidiary and majority-owned subsidiary
in such a way as to divert value to the wholly owned subsidiary runs afoul of the entire fairness
standard).
76. Such speculation might begin with the fact that fiduciary duties are technically owed
to the corporate entity, not the shareholders. While in most cases we think about them as
running to the shareholders, this is just a useful heuristic. The diversified shareholder argument
might be one of those cases where this useful heuristic leads to confusion. As for the market
for corporate control argument, it is certainly true that market forces can impose a powerful
check on mismanagement. But these market forces are meant as complements to, not
substitutes for, fiduciary duties. This fact appears all the wiser when one considers how the
market for corporate control has changed over time.
77. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989) (holding that Revlon does not apply in a stock-for-stock
merger where the acquiror does not have a controlling shareholder).
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defined as a sale of a company to an acquiror that itself has a controlling
shareholder.78 It is likely that conflicts of interest are greater in a control transaction
than in non-control transactions. This is because a controlling shareholder typically
reaps a disproportionate share of the synergies created by a transaction and therefore
has an enhanced incentive to pay off target officers and directors through side
payments (lucrative consulting fees, transaction bonuses, and the like) to persuade
them to make a deal with the acquiror. Some have made the additional suggestion
that the conflicts of interest inherent in a control transaction are also shielded from
the market for corporate control because the controlling shareholder can effectively
rebuff any subsequent offers for the combined company.79 It has also been pointed
out that diversified shareholders will not be indifferent about the distribution of posttransaction gains between the target and acquiror where the acquiror has a controlling
shareholder because a diversified shareholder cannot reap the disproportionate gains
of a controlling shareholder. And therefore, it cannot be said that these gains and
losses will average out over time.80
However, as discussed above, even assuming these arguments are correct,81 this
is not the way corporate law works, and therefore in my view these arguments do not
really help us understand Revlon. But fortunately, we do not need them for that
purpose because the fact that control transactions involve a control premium and noncontrol transactions do not (and therefore that control transactions involve a greater
risk of side payments to the target’s directors or officers) is a sufficient reason to
distinguish between the two for the purposes of Revlon.
While Revlon’s control trigger might be relatively easily explained in this way as
consistent with the concern for conflicts of interest, the same cannot be said of the
other two triggers, which both seem to involve the breakup of the company.82 Why
would a sale or reorganization involving the breakup of the company be worthy of
particular attention when conflicts of interest are at stake? The reason is not because
such transactions are likely to involve an elevated risk of conflicts of interest as was
true in the case of the control transaction trigger. Rather, here, the motivation
underlying these triggers more likely has to do with a desire to identify situations
where the costs of failing to police conflicts of interest are particularly high. In the

78. See Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42 (Del. 1993).
79. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 69, at 3310.
80. Id. at 3310–11.
81. See supra notes 72–77 and accompanying text.
82. To be sure, it is not exactly clear what the relationship is between these two triggers.
After all, it is not clear why a reorganization involving the breakup of the company (of the
type described in the first trigger) would not cover the type of transaction described in the
second trigger. And although the first trigger clearly covers a reorganization involving the
clear breakup of the company, it is not obvious whether the active bidding process alone acts
as a Revlon trigger or whether it too must involve the clear breakup of the company. See
Bainbridge, supra note 69, at 3306. As discussed above, there is a plausible explanation for
why one might want to address a transaction involving the breakup of the company—if one is
trying to police conflicts of interests, it is not as clear why an auction on its own (in other
words, one not involving a corporate breakup) is any more susceptible to conflicts of interest
than any other M&A transaction. For this reason, I choose to read the clause involving the
“breakup” language in the first trigger as modifying both the reorganization clause as well as
the active bidding clause.
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case of the company breaking itself up by selling its assets—whether as the result of
a reorganization, active bidding process or alternative transaction pursued in
response to a takeover bid—this is the last opportunity for the owners of the target’s
particular collection of assets to get the best price available for them. To paraphrase
Vice Chancellor Lamb in a slightly different context, the directors must maximize
present, not long-term, share value because for the present shareholders, there is no
long term.83
This endgame justification is also consistent with the case law, including Revlon
itself. There, Forstmann Little was proposing to take Revlon private,84 and therefore
it is likely that even under Bainbridge’s view, Revlon’s intermediate scrutiny would
apply. After all, whereas diversified shareholders will not normally care about purely
distributional issues, they will when the acquiror is a private entity, like Forstmann
Little, since by definition they cannot own stock in the acquiror. Additionally, under
Bainbridge’s view, we might not normally concern ourselves about inefficient sales
resulting from conflicts of interest because the market for corporate control will take
care of such things.85 However, because Forstmann Little is a private acquiror, there
is no opportunity for an efficient buyer to acquire Forstmann and Revlon. For these
reasons, Bainbridge is likely to see no inconsistency between his theory and Revlon.
The only problem is that this was not the Delaware Supreme Court’s reasoning in
Revlon. It was not concerned with the fact that Forstmann Little was a private
acquiror.86 Rather, it was concerned that, given the inevitable breakup of the
company, this was the last opportunity for the shareholders of the Revlon assets, as
constituted at the time, to get the best price for those assets.87 In other words, the
court was focused on the inevitable breakup of the company, not the non-public
status of the acquiror.88 For that reason, I think that this endgame justification is a
more precedentially consistent way of defending the breakup related triggers of
Revlon.
With all of this said, I do not want to give the impression that these corporate
breakup triggers are unusually important in the everyday world of M&A practice.
They are not. Rather, the most common real-world situation to which Revlon applies
includes the sale of control, as in Paramount v. QVC. The other situation—actually
the most common situation—where Revlon applies is the scenario where the target
is being acquired for cash or mostly cash.89 To be sure, this scenario is not identified
among the three triggers set forth above. Nevertheless, it is widely accepted by

83. See TW Servs., Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., Nos. 10427, 10298, 1989 WL 20290,
at *7 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989) (footnotes omitted) (explaining why cash consideration triggers
Revlon).
84. Forstmann Little was a privately held private equity firm. Adam Lashinsky, How
Teddy Forstmann Lost His Groove, CNN (July 26, 2004), https://money.cnn.com/magazines
/fortune/fortune_archive/2004/07/26/377149/index.htm [https://perma.cc/KX4Z-94HL].
85. See Bainbridge, supra note 69 at 3294–96.
86. In fact, the court never even mentions that Forstmann Little was privately owned. See
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. There is no clear line for determining what percentage of cash in a mixed cash-stock
deal is necessary in order to trigger Revlon.
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practitioners,90 and supported by Delaware caselaw,91 that Revlon applies in cash
mergers. The question is why?
The stated rationale is questionable at best. That rationale is basically the endgame
argument once again: in cash mergers, the target shareholders are being cashed out
and thus, this is the last opportunity for these shareholders to get the best price for
the target’s collection of assets.92 The problem with this argument though is that it
simply does not stand up to scrutiny. At least in a situation where the acquiror is a
publicly traded company, cashed-out target shareholders who wish to participate in
getting the best price for the target’s assets in the future can simply reinvest in the
publicly traded acquiror which now also owns the target. Thus, although I disagree
with commentators like Bainbridge that the endgame justification has no role to play
in explaining the Revlon triggers—I think it is the only explanation of the breakup
triggers—I agree with him that it makes no sense in justifying the comparatively
more recent trend to apply Revlon to cash mergers.
Regardless of its justification, however, the fact that cash consideration triggers
Revlon is at this point beyond dispute.93 Along with the change of control trigger, the
cash consideration trigger represents the most common reason for Revlon. For this
reason, in the data section in Part II below, I will focus on these two triggers for
determining to what transactions in our dataset Revlon applies.
B. What Does Revlon Require?
As the Delaware Supreme Court explained in the Barkan case and has reiterated
many times since, “there is no single blueprint that a board must follow to fulfill its
duties [under Revlon].”94 Under Revlon’s reasonableness review, the court takes into
account a number of considerations: whether there was a market check of any kind,
either active or passive, and whether before or after the merger or acquisition
agreement was executed;95 the target board’s knowledge of the company and its

90. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASSOC. MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS COMM., supra note 15, at xxiv
(“[A]n acquisition transaction that is primarily a cash transaction will be subject to Revlon . .
. .”).
91. See Manesh, supra note 69, at 14 n.84 (collecting cases).
92. See, e.g., TW Servs., Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., Nos. 10427, 10298, 1989 WL
20290, at *6 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989) (“In the setting of a sale of a company for cash, the
board’s duty to shareholders is inconsistent with acts not designed to maximize present share
value, acts which in other circumstances might be . . . justified by reference to the long run
interest of shareholders. In such a setting, for the present shareholders, there is no long run.”).
93. See LOU R. KLING, BRANDON VAN DYKE & EILEEN T. NUGENT, NEGOTIATED
ACQUISITIONS OF COMPANIES, SUBSIDIARIES AND DIVISIONS § 4.04 (observing that in a cash
deal “Revlon clearly applies”).
94. Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989); see also RBC Cap.
Mkts., LLC v. Jervis, 129 A.3d 816 (Del. 2015); C&J Energy Servs., Inc. v. City of Miami
Gen. Emps.’ & Sanitation Emps.’ Ret. Tr., 107 A.3d 1049 (Del. 2014); Lyondell Chem. Co.
v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235 (Del. 2009); Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637
A.2d 34, 42 (Del. 1994).
95. A “passive market check” refers to the target board’s ability to consider alternative
bids and the likelihood that such bids will materialize. In the period prior to signing the merger
agreement, a robust passive market check will require a sufficient period of time before signing
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industry;96 the target’s visibility in the particular industry and financial community,
as evidenced, for example, by the level of its analyst following;97 the course of
negotiations between the target and acquiror, including whether there was a serious
back-and-forth between the parties that resulted in a price representing a premium
over market;98 whether other terms of the agreement, individually or in the aggregate,
have the effect of discouraging an interested party from making a superior proposal.99
With respect to this last factor, other relevant contractual terms include breakup fees,
which are payable by the target to the acquiror in the event that the deal fails to close
for certain reasons;100 “matching rights,” a provision that gives the acquiror the
ability to match a third party’s superior bid in the post-signing phase;101 and “lockups,” provisions that give the acquiror stock or target assets, often at a significantly
discounted price, which act as a concession prize in the event of a topping bid but
also deter such bids in the first place.102
But although there might be no single blueprint, there is a common theme to the
varied blueprints that exist: information. Whatever sales process the target board
adopts under Revlon, they have to be able to demonstrate that they possess sufficient
information to determine the company’s value and appropriately evaluate competing
bids. The Barkan court clearly thought that in most cases, such information was only
obtainable by canvassing the market either prior to signing (by publicly inviting bids)

and closing for alternative bids to emerge. In the period following the signing of the merger
agreement, a robust passive market check will also require the contractual right on the part of
the target board to talk to and share information with other bidders and withdraw or withhold
their recommendation from shareholders to vote in favor of the merger. Usually this
contractual right is structured as an exception, called a “fiduciary out,” to a “no solicitation”
or “no-shop” provision barring the target board from actively soliciting interest in the
company. An “active market check” refers to the target board’s active solicitation of bids for
the company. For this to occur post-signing, the target board will typically need a “go-shop”
provision, which specifically grants this right of solicitation.
96. See, e.g., In re MONY Grp. Inc. S’holder Litig., 852 A.2d 9 (Del. Ch. 2004) (finding
that the board acted reasonably even though it did not actively solicit bidders because it was
financially sophisticated and had knowledge of the industry).
97. See, e.g., In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94, 123 n.22 (Del. Ch. 2007)
(denying the plaintiff’s Revlon claim in part on the basis that the target “is one of the largest
corporations in the United States with deep analyst coverage”).
98. See, e.g., In re Bear Stearns Litig., 870 N.Y.S.2d 709, 732 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (“A
satisfactory showing under Revlon has been made where, as here, the directors: were
sophisticated and knowledgeable about the industry and strategic alternatives available to the
company; were involved in the negotiation process and bargained hard; relied on expert
advice; and received a fairness opinion from a financial advisor.”).
99. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del.
1986).
100. See, e.g., Thomas W. Bates & Michael L. Lemmon, Breaking Up is Hard to Do? “An
Analysis of Termination Fee Provisions and Merger Outcomes, 69 J. FIN. ECON. 469 (2003);
Micah S. Officer, Termination Fees in Mergers and Acquisitions, 69 J. FIN. ECON. 431 (2003).
101. See, e.g., Fernán Restrepo & Guhan Subramanian, The New Look of Deal Protection,
69 STAN. L. REV. 1013 (2017).
102. See, e.g., Steven M. Davidoff & Christina M. Sautter, Lock-Up Creep, 38 J. CORP. L.
681 (2013).
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or after signing by way of a go-shop provision.103 Nevertheless, the court made clear
that this would not always be the case, although it “decline[d] to fashion an iron-clad
rule for determining when a market test is not required.”104 At the same time, the
court went out of its way to clarify that “[t]he situations in which a completely
passive approach to acquiring such knowledge [that the shareholders are getting the
best price] is appropriate are limited.”105
And yet, Barkan ended up being just such a case. Recall that it involved a
management led leveraged buyout where no buyers other than management emerged
for a period of ten months.106 Additionally, management’s offering price reflected
certain tax advantages accruing to management that were unlikely to be captured by
any other bidders, which, combined with the company’s declining earnings, served
as a basis for the directors’ view that no other deal would result in a better price.107
More recent cases have suggested that the situations where, in a single bidder
context, a passive approach is appropriate are perhaps not as limited as Barkan had
suggested. For example, in C&J Energy Services, Inc. v. City of Miami General
Employees’ & Sanitation Employees’ Retirement Trust, the Delaware Supreme Court
confirmed that an active market check, either pre- or post-signing (by means of a
“go-shop provision”)108 is not required, even when the target board’s knowledge of
the market is less than “impeccable,” although there must be time available for at
least a passive market check.109 In C&J Energy Services, there were four months
between the signing date and the expected closing date, a factor that was important
in the court’s decision that the target board complied with their Revlon duties.110
Although it is difficult to generalize, prior to C&J Energy Services, most
practitioners would probably have agreed that in order to minimize one’s potential
Revlon exposure, in the absence of a go-shop provision, it would be wise to pursue a
pre-signing market check, preferably an active one, combined with a fiduciary out in
the event the agreement contains a no-shop provision and a termination fee in the 3%
range.111 Because Revlon does not require the target board to pick a particular bidder,
as long as the board follows this process, it will almost certainly satisfy the Revlon

103. See 567 A.2d 1279, 1287 (Del. 1989) (“When the board is considering a single offer
and has no reliable grounds upon which to judge its adequacy, this concern for fairness
demands a canvas of the market to determine if higher bids may be elicited.”). A “go-shop”
provision is one that explicitly allows the target company to solicit bidders during a period of
time between signing and closing, subject to certain conditions.
104. Id. at 1288.
105. Id. at 1287.
106. See id. at 1281–83.
107. See id. at 1287–88.
108. See supra note 103.
109. 107 A.3d 1049, 1070 (Del. 2014) (opining that a four- or five-month period between
signing and closing was more than enough time for a serious bidder to express interest).
110. See id.
111. For example, in the ABA’s 2017 Deal Points Study of Public Company Mergers, the
average breakup fee was around 3% and the vast majority of deals contained fiduciary outs.
Claudia K. Simon et al.,Strategic Buyer/Public Target M&A Deal Points Study, 2017 A.B.A.
MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS COMM. STUDY 46, 88, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam
/aba/administrative/business_law/deal_points/2017_public_study.pdf.authcheckdam [https:/
/perma.cc/7E8D-5BQC].
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standard of reasonableness. Of course, in the wake of C&J Energy Services, it is
possible that a target could adopt a far laxer process and still meet Revlon’s
reasonableness standard.
Let us pause at this point and consider then what Revlon requires. As originally
conceived, Revlon, where applicable, requires the target board to act as an auctioneer,
selling the company for the highest price available.112 This auctioneering duty
implies a procedural and substantive component: in order to sell for the highest price
available, one must adopt a process that will generate a menu of prices.113 And then
one must choose the highest price among this menu of options.114
However, as the doctrine has developed, both of these substantive and procedural
requirements have been significantly watered down. On the substantive side of the
ledger, courts since Revlon have backed off substantially from the apparent
requirement to choose the best price.115 In perhaps the clearest articulation of this
evolved position, the Delaware Court of Chancery has said that Revlon does not
require the target board to accept the offer of, or even negotiate with, a bidder solely
because the bidder offers a higher price, provided there are legitimate reasons to
prefer the original bid.116 In Family Dollar, the chancery court held that the target
was not required to negotiate with a bidder whose offer was, unlike the original
bidder’s, an all-cash offer and made at a price that was more than 7% greater than
the original bidder’s. The target’s reason for preferring the original bid was that it
was, in its determination, more likely to be approved by antitrust authorities.117 This
holding gives target boards enormous latitude in choosing among bidders.
To be sure, if two bids were identical in all respects other than price, it seems
unlikely that the target board could choose the lower bid consistent with its Revlon
duties. However, it is never the case that bids are identical. There will always be
differences. The question will be whether the difference the target identifies is
sufficiently important to justify choosing the lower bid. But the trend appears to be
that in the absence of any obvious conflict on the target board, the courts will defer
to the board.118
That brings us to the second component of what Revlon requires, the procedural
component. Originally, in Barkan, the Delaware Supreme Court suggested that in
most cases, Revlon will require a target board to conduct an active market check,
either prior to or after entering into a merger agreement.119 Subsequent courts
interpreting Barkan concluded that under Revlon, the only situation where a target
board could avoid an active market check was if it had an “impeccable knowledge
of the company’s business for the Court to determine that it acted reasonably.”120

112. 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986).
113. See Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989).
114. See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
115. See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 44 (Del.
1993) (discussing the need to choose the bid with the “best value” instead of the “best price”).
116. See In re Family Dollar Stores, Inc. S’holder Litig., No. 9985–CB, 2014 WL 7246436
(Del. Ch. Dec. 19, 2014).
117. See id.
118. See infra text accompanying notes 185–86.
119. See Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989).
120. In re OPENLANE, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 6849-VCN, 2011 WL 4599662, at *5
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However, in C&J Energy Services, the Delaware Supreme Court rejected this
interpretation of Barkan and, in what was either a highly creative reading of that case
or a silent overturning of it, held that an active market check is not required “so long
as interested bidders have a fair opportunity to present a higher-value alternative, and
the board has the flexibility to eschew the original transaction and accept the highervalue deal.”121
In other words, Revlon has evolved to a point where there is very little substantive
review as long as the process is reasonable—courts do not generally police whether
the target has selected the “best price” or even the “best value.” Thus, as long as the
target conducts a reasonable process, it might choose Bid A over Bid B even though
Bid A is the lower price of the two. At the same time, what counts as a reasonable
process has also been redefined in the target board’s favor so that in some, if not
many, cases, a target board might, consistent with Revlon, enter into a deal with the
bidder without first running an active market check, as long as the breakup fee is
reasonable and there is a sufficient amount of time between signing and closing for
other bidders to emerge.122 The question is whether these changes drain Revlon of its
relevance. That is the question I take up in the next Part.
II. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
A. Hypothesis: Whether Revlon Duties Make a Difference
Does Revlon actually increase short-term shareholder value? There are at least
two reasons to believe that it does, one theoretical and the other empirical. The
theoretical reason for why Revlon likely increases short-term shareholder value is
that that is precisely what Revlon’s auctioneering duty was meant to do.123 However,
as explained in Part I, in recent years, the Delaware courts have pruned that duty
back significantly such that Revlon now requires little more than a reasonable
process, which itself requires even less auction-like value-maximizing behavior on
the part of the target board than in the original articulation of the doctrine.124
Nevertheless, there is also a strong empirical reason to think that Revlon, despite
these doctrinal developments, still serves to increase short-term shareholder value. A
longstanding, robust finding in the M&A literature is that cash deals are better for
shareholders than stock deals.125 In fact, cash deals are better not just for shareholders
of the target, but shareholders of the acquiror as well.126 Additionally, deal premia

(Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2011).
121. C&J Energy Servs., Inc. v. City of Miami Gen. Emps.’ & Sanitation Emps.’ Ret. Tr.,
107 A.3d 1049, 1067–68 (Del. 2014).
122. See id.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 121–22.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 121–22.
125. See Eliezer M. Fich, Edward M. Rice & Anh L. Tran, Contractual Revisions in
Compensation: Evidence from Merger Bonuses to Target CEOs, 61 J. ACCT. & ECON. 338
(2016); Ulrike Malmendier, Marcus M. Opp & Farzad Saidi, Target Revaluation After Failed
Takeover Attempts: Cash Versus Stock, 119 J. FIN. ECON. 92 (2016); Andrei Shleifer & Robert
W. Vishny, Stock Market Driven Acquisitions, 70 J. FIN. ECON. 295 (2003).
126. See, e.g., Fich et al., supra note 125, at 352.
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tend to be higher in deals that are primarily cash based.127 It is not exactly clear why
this is the case. There is some evidence that cash deals signal to the market that the
target is undervalued,128 although it is not clear why they should have a similar effect
on the acquiror’s abnormal market returns on deal announcement.
To be sure, none of these studies speculate, let alone test whether, this result has
anything to do with Revlon. In fact, none of these studies exhibit any awareness of
the existence of Revlon. Nevertheless, it does stand to reason that some of this “cash
consideration effect” has something to do with the fact that cash deals tend to follow
a different sales process because of Revlon, and that sales process is intended to
maximize short-term shareholder returns. However, to test this hypothesis we would
need to control for the target’s sales process, something that none of these other
studies do. This leads to our first prediction:
Prediction 1: Deals subject to Revlon duties tend to make more frequent
use of pre-signing active market checks, enter into a greater number of
contracts, and receive a greater number of bids than non-Revlon deals.129
But does this Revlon-mandated sales process have any actual effect on short-term
shareholder value? One might think so based on the stated goal of the doctrine and
the M&A literature’s finding that cash deals (which typically trigger Revlon) are
correlated with higher target shareholder returns. On the other hand, the doctrine’s
recent de-evolutionary trend along with the M&A literature’s ignoring of Revlon’s
influence altogether might cause one to question the doctrine’s practical relevance.
These reasons lead to our second prediction:
Prediction 2: The Revlon sales process does not affect merger premia or
market abnormal returns.
B. Data
I begin with all of the M&A transactions in Westlaw’s Practical Law database
from 2009 to 2016, which is a total of 1253 deals.130 As the chart below illustrates,

127. See, e.g., id. at 348; Malmendier et al., supra note 125, at 92.
128. See, e.g., Malmendier et al., supra note 125, at 92.
129. Recall that in C&J Energy Services, the Delaware Supreme Court held that Revlon
does not require the active solicitation process implied by earlier precedent. C&J Energy
Servs., Inc. v. City of Miami Gen. Emps.’ & Sanitation Emps.’ Ret. Tr., 107 A.3d 1049, 1067–
68 (Del. 2014). However, that case was only decided in 2014. Consequently, I think it is safe
to say that a sample of transactions that largely pre-dates this opinion should reflect that older
precedent adopted a stronger presumption in favor of an active solicitation process.
130. A different period could have been selected. However, commentators have noted that
the Revlon doctrine has evolved over time, with some suggesting that since the Delaware
Supreme Court’s decision in Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235 (Del. 2009), the
doctrine has not seemed to entail the enhanced substantive scrutiny implied by earlier opinions
like Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 44 (Del. 1994). See Lyman
Johnson & Robert Ricca, The Dwindling of Revlon, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 167, 172 (2014).
Since this Article is primarily concerned with how the Revlon doctrine works now, I’m
particularly interested in the post-Lyondell period. Lyondell was decided in 2009, and therefore
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this period of time includes a slowdown for M&A activity in the wake of the financial
crisis of 2007–2009, but it also includes the build-up to the M&A wave that we have
experienced over the past couple of years. However, it excludes the significant M&A
boom beginning in the early 2000s, which, combined with the fact that the Revlon
doctrine might have worked differently during this time period,131 might explain the
slightly different results found by other papers.132
Chart 1: U.S. M&A Activity133

From this data set, I then pull relevant deal characteristics data from SDC
Platinum for these transactions. I end up dropping about half of these transactions
because of a lack of Compustat data for the target firm, which results in 697 deals. I
drop forty of these observations because of a lack of Eventus data for these deals. Of
the remaining 657 deals, I take a random sample of 290 of them to which I add handcollected data from Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings.
To test the two predictions outlined above, I am primarily concerned with two
different sets of variables: First, there are the dependent variables, which consist of
event study data (how the market reacts to announcement of the deal, as measured
by abnormal returns) as well as market premium data (the premium that the deal price
represents over the target’s pre-announcement market price).
Second, there are the independent variables of interest, which are primarily the
variables that deal with deal process: whether Revlon applied, whether the target
pursued a pre-signing active market check, the number of contacts the target had with
potential bidders, as well as the number of bids the target received. Of interest are
also variables pertaining to the M&A agreement itself: the size of the breakup fee,

I chose that year as the starting point of our data.
131. See Johnson & Ricca, supra note 130, at 172.
132. See Matthew D. Cain, Sean J. Griffith, Robert J. Jackson, Jr. & Steven Davidoff
Solomon, Does Revlon Matter? An Empirical and Theoretical Study (Eur. Corp. Governance
Inst. – Law, Working Paper No. 466, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=3418499 [https://perma.cc/CQJ8-M6X9].
133. United States–M&A Statistics, IMMA INST., https://imaa-institute.org/m-and-a-usunited-states/ [https://perma.cc/95JS-4ZTX].
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the presence of a go-shop, the nature of the fiduciary out, and the number of days the
acquiror has to match a potential superior offer by an interloping bidder.
Additionally, there are variables that attempt to control for the presence of conflicts
of interest at the target. These include whether the CEO received a payment, distinct
from pre-negotiated parachute payments, in connection with the transaction—for
example, a transaction bonus or a consulting agreement or the like. These variables
of interest also include any post-closing positions that the CEO will hold at the
combined company, whether the CEO is also the chairman of the target, and the
number of years the CEO has before retirement (assuming a retirement age of sixtyfive).
The other variables attempt to control for deal characteristics, including, for
example, where the target and acquiror operate in different industries and whether
the merger is a merger of equals, as well as various characteristics of the target,
including, for example, asset size, operating cash flow and other financial metrics.
All of these variables are summarized below in Table 1.
Table 1: Definition of Variables
Conflict
of Interest

Source: SEC filings, except for CEO data,
which comes from Execucomp

Side Payment

One if the target CEO received some payment in connection
with the transaction (e.g., transaction bonus, retention
agreement, consulting agreement), zero otherwise

Post-deal Prestige
Job

One if the target CEO is to be made the CEO of the combined
company, the CEO of a subsidiary of the combined company
or the chairman of the board of the combined company,
zero otherwise

Post-deal
Director

One if target CEO is to be made a member of the board of
directors of the combined company (other than chairman of
the board), zero otherwise

Post-deal
employment

One if the target CEO will be a director or employee of the
combined company following the transaction, zero otherwise

CEO Chairman

One if the target CEO is also the chairman of the target board,
zero otherwise

Years to
Retirement
M&A Agreement
Data

The greater of zero and sixty-five minus the target CEO’s age
Source: Westlaw Practical Law

Pro Acquiror
Breakup Fee

Number of standard deviations the breakup fee is from the
sample average of 3%, rounded to the nearest whole number,
zero for any negative standard deviation

Pro Acquiror No
Go-Shop

One if the transaction agreement contains a go-shop
provision, zero otherwise
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Pro Acquiror
Fiduciary Out

One if the fiduciary out to the target board recommendation
covenant is conditioned on a determination that (i) fiduciary
duties require the board to not make the recommendation and
(ii) the proposal is “superior”, zero if it only requires
determination (i)

Match Rights

One if the agreement contains a right for the acquiror to match
a third party’s offer that otherwise triggers the target board’s
fiduciary out

Days to Match

The number of days the acquiror has to match the third
party’s bid pursuant to the match right

Deal Process
Characteristics
Passive Market
Check

One if the target conducted a passive market check (i.e., did
not solicit bids), zero otherwise

Number of Total
Contacts

The number of total prospective bidders, including the
acquiror, the target talked to regarding a potential transaction

Bids

The number of bids, formal and informal, the target received
from unique bidders, including the acquiror’s (in other words,
this number does not take into account the total number of
bids any single bidder might have made)

Revlon

One if either the target is acquired for more than 50% cash or
the acquiror has a controlling shareholder and the target does
not

Target Initiated
First Contact
CEO
Compensation
CEO Stock Option
Ownership
Deal
Characteristics
Same Industry

Source: SEC filings

One if the target was the first to contact the acquiror, zero
otherwise
Source: Execucomp
The value of the CEO’s stock options
Source: SDC Platinum,
except for the event study data, which is from Eventus
One if both the target and the acquiror belong to the same
forty-eight industry classification group

Tender Offer

One if the deal is structured as a tender offer, zero otherwise

Merger of Equals

One if the deal is classified as a merger of equal

Premium

Offer price to target stock price premium one day prior to
announcement

Cumulative
Abnormal Return
(CAR)

The target’s CAR over the window (-1,+1) around the merger
announcement date, calculated as the residual from the market
model estimated during the one-year window ending four
weeks prior to the merger announcement
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Source: Compustat

Size

The market value of the target’s assets

Leverage

The target’s book value of debt divided by the sum of book
value of debt and market value of equity

M/B

The target’s market value of equity divided by the book value
of equity

OCF

The target’s cash flow from operations scaled by the value of
assets

Perhaps the most important variable is the Revlon variable, which measures
whether Revlon applies to the transaction in question or not. As discussed in Part I,
the two most common scenarios where Revlon applies is where the deal is for cash
or where the acquiror is a controlled company and the target is not. For this reason,
our Revlon variable is equal to one if either of these situations describes the deal in
question and zero otherwise. Chart 2 below provides more information regarding the
Revlon variable. About 208 deals, or about 72% of the deals in our sample, trigger
Revlon. Of these deals, the vast majority are cash deals. In fact, only four of these
208 deals trigger Revlon solely because the acquiror is a controlled company and the
target is not. Although twelve of the deals in our sample involve a controlled
acquiror, eight of these are also cash deals, and thus they do not trigger Revlon solely
because of the fact that the acquiror is a controlled company. Approximately 7% of
all companies in the S&P 1500 are subject to a controlling shareholder,134 and
therefore our sample represents a smaller proportion of controlled acquirors (12/290,
or 4%) than is in the general population.
Chart 2: Revlon Variable
Cash Consideration

82

Stock Consideration,
Controlled Acquiror

4
204

Stock Consideration,
Non-Controlled Acquiror

Relevant summary statistics for other variables are set forth below in Table 2
below. According to Table 2, roughly 55% of the deals in our sample adopt an active
pre-signing market check, which means that not every deal that triggers Revlon
adopts an active pre-signing market check. This should not be all that surprising

134. Edward Kamonioh, Controlled Companies in the Standard & Poor’s 1500: A Followup Review of Performance & Risk, INV. RESP. RSCH. CTR. INST. (Mar. 2016),
https://www.weinberg.udel.edu/IIRCiResearchDocuments/2016/03/Controlled-CompaniesIRRCI-2015-FINAL-3-16-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/SZA4-M5LX].
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considering that the courts have never said that an active pre-signing market check
is necessary, although in cases like Barkan, the Delaware Supreme Court signaled a
strong preference for one.135 Post-signing active market checks, by contrast, are
relatively rare. Only about 5% of the deals in our sample employ a go-shop provision.
This is slightly less than the percentage of go-shops in other studies.136 In 31% of the
deals in our sample, the target was the one to reach out to the initial bidder. The
targets in our sample receive on average a total of two bids prior to signing the deal
with the target, but the median is only one.
Although not reflected in Table 2, the average breakup fee, payable by the target
to the acquiror in the event the deal does not close for certain reasons, is 3%, which
is consistent with practitioner advice about what is “market” with respect to breakup
fees.137 Interestingly, the vast majority of the fiduciary outs have a particular
formulation that favors the acquiror by making it more difficult for the target to
exploit; the formulation being a fiduciary out conditioned on a determination that (i)
fiduciary duties require the board to not make the recommendation and (ii) the
proposal is “superior.”
With respect to conflicts of interest, the CEOs in our sample are relatively young,
approximately fifty-five on average; roughly 42% of these CEOs are also the
chairman of the board. Additionally, 50% of the CEOs in our sample receive some
sort of post-deal employment, with 33% receiving a post-deal “prestige” position,
which, in this context, means becoming either the CEO or chairman of the combined
company or remaining as the CEO of a subsidiary of the combined company (most
likely the target).
Finally, with respect to the independent variables, the average deal price
represents a 33% premium over the market price one day prior to the announcement
of the deal. The market tends to like these deals on average, with positive abnormal
returns of the combined target and acquiror. However, the market does not appear to
like the price acquirors pay on average, as evidenced by the negative abnormal
returns for acquirors. These statistics are consistent with the literature showing that
acquirors tend to overpay in M&A transactions.138

135. See supra notes 102–06 and accompanying text.
136. See, e.g., Jin Q. Jeon & Cheolwoo Lee, Effective Post-Signing Market Check or
Window Dressing? The Role of Go-Shop Provisions in M&A Transactions, 41 J. BUS. FIN. &
ACCT. 210 (2014) (finding that out of 1706 transactions from 2004 to 2010, roughly 8%
contained go-shops).
137. See, e.g., MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS COMM., AM. BAR ASS’N, STRATEGIC
BUYER/PUBLIC TARGET M&A DEAL POINTS STUDY 88 (2017).
138. See, e.g., Laurence Capron & Nathalie Pistre, When Do Acquirers Earn Abnormal
Returns?, 23 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 781 (2002).
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable
Match Rights

Proportion
of Sample

Years to Retirement
0.5052

Post-Deal Director

0.0900

Post-Deal Prestige Job

0.3322

Passive Market Check

0.4498

Bids
Target Initiated First Contact

0.3101

Pro Acquiror Fiduciary Out

0.9723

Pro Acquiror Breakup Fee

0.3292

0.2967

8.6817

9

2.1319

1

0.2702

0

0.2243

0.2052

8.676

4

0.9550

CAR
Side Payment

4.0000

0.4236

Post-Deal Employment

Pro Acquiror No Go-Shop

3.8132
0.7093

Premium
CEO Chairman

Median

0.9619

Days to Match
Revlon

Mean

0.1697

Number of Total Contacts

C. Empirical Analysis
The first prediction is that Revlon duties affect the deal process. To test this
prediction, I start off by running a simple t-test to see how the relevant deal process
characteristics and M&A agreement data are different (as a matter of statistical
significance) when a target is in Revlon mode as compared to when it is not.
Table 3: Revlon’s Effect on Deal Process
Variable

Mean with
Revlon

Mean without
Revlon

Statistical
Significance

Passive Market Check

0.4097

0.5476

0.0344**

Total # Contacts

9.0980

7.6386

0.4894

Pro Acquiror Fiduciary Out

0.9951

0.9167

0.0124**

Pro Acquiror Breakup Fee

0.2272

0.3752

0.1092

Pro Acquiror No Go-Shop

0.9463

0.9762

0.1957

Match Rights

0.9707

0.9405

0.291

Days to Match

3.7854

3.8810

0.5906

Bids

2.2390

1.8795

0.1983

*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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These results are consistent with Prediction 1 that a target being in Revlon mode
affects the deal process. In particular, in our sample, targets in Revlon mode pursue
an active market check about 15% more often than targets outside of Revlon mode.
The coefficient on the breakup fee variable is not statistically significant; however,
it is not far off. Furthermore, its positive value is consistent with intuition—breakup
fees tend to be smaller when in Revlon mode than not.139 Interestingly, the coefficient
on the fiduciary out variable is a little counterintuitive. Every deal in our sample
contains a fiduciary out. However, the results in Table 3 show that when a target is
in Revlon mode, the deals in our sample are more likely to have an acquiror-friendly
version of the fiduciary out than when the target is not in Revlon mode. This more
acquiror-friendly version of the fiduciary out is one that makes it harder for the target
to claim a fiduciary out by requiring it to demonstrate not only that the target board’s
fiduciary duties require consideration of the third-party proposal but also that the
third-party proposal is in fact “superior” to the proposal reflected in the target’s
agreement with the acquiror.
In other words, a target being in Revlon mode makes an active market check more
likely and decreases the size of the breakup fee, both of which benefit the target. But
Revlon mode is also associated with contract provisions that benefit the acquiror,
making it harder for the target board to avoid recommending the acquiror’s deal to
the target shareholders.
In some ways, this should not be at all surprising. Negotiating leverage does not
simply disappear when negotiating outcomes are affected by legal change. Rather,
parties will no doubt assert their given negotiating leverage through other outcomes
that are rough substitutes for those outcomes affected by the legal change in question.
Thus, Revlon clearly makes it more likely that a target, regardless of negotiating
leverage, will succeed in prevailing on certain deal process-related negotiating
points—including, for example, obtaining an active market check, a modest breakup
fee, and a fiduciary out. This is because Revlon case law has long expressed a
preference for these deal-process characteristics when a target is in Revlon mode.
However, Revlon does not destroy negotiating leverage altogether. Accordingly, one
would expect to see acquirors in Revlon mode prevailing on other deal-process
characteristics about which Revlon case law has had very little or nothing to say, like
the specific design of the fiduciary out.
Thus, Table 3 is consistent with Prediction 1: Revlon mode affects deal process,
making targets more likely to secure certain target-friendly deal-process variables
like modest breakup fees and active market checks but, at the same time, making
acquirors more likely to obtain acquiror-friendly deal process attributes about which
Revlon case law is more or less silent.
To inspect further the determinants of these various deal process-variables that,
according to Table 1, are correlated with whether a target is in Revlon mode or not,
I ran the logit regression in Table 4 where the dependent variable is the Passive

139. Remember that the variable is the number of standard deviations away from the
sample mean of 3%. Thus, one cannot interpret the difference of the means here as referring
simply to differences in the total percentage of the breakup fee. Technically, what these results
show is that, in our sample, the breakup fee is about .13 standard deviations closer to the 3%
sample mean when the target is in Revlon mode than when the target is not. See supra Table
3.
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Market Check variable, which equals a one if the pre-signing market check is passive
and a zero if it is active. The independent variable of interest in this regression is
primarily the Revlon variable.
Table 4: Determinants of Market Check Decision
Dependent Variable = Passive Market Check
Determinant

Coeff.

P-Value

Revlon

-0.0169

0.0043

***

Target Initiated First Contact

-0.0475

0.0000

***

CEO Chairman

0.0181

0.0012

***

CEO Stock Option Ownership

0.0000

0.8687

Years to Retirement
-0.0004
0.9234
N = 285
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.

The fact that the Revlon variable in Table 4 has a negative coefficient and is
statistically significant at the 1% level is consistent with the notion that Revlon affects
the decision to do an active, rather than passive, market check. This is also consistent
with Prediction 1 above.140
But Table 4 provides additional color to the decision whether to conduct a passive
market check or not. In particular, it suggests that whether the CEO is the chairman
or not is also relevant to the decision, because the CEO chairman variable is
statistically significant. Moreover, Table 4 suggests that targets whose CEO also
serves as the chairman of the board tend to avoid an active market check. Why might
this be the case? It seems reasonable to assume that if a CEO has a bias about who
to sell the company to, perhaps because of conflicts of interest, then it seems
plausible that the CEO will prefer a passive market check to an active one. Bringing
in additional bidders under an active market check risks causing the board to prefer
some bidder other than the CEO’s favored one. The passive market check avoids this
possibility. Therefore, the passive market check makes it easier for a conflicted CEO
to realize his preferred outcome. But, of course, the CEO does not unilaterally get to
decide whether to pursue an active or passive market check. That decision is left up
to the board. However, if the CEO is the chairman of the board, then he has a much
greater influence over that decision. Thus, this result might be consistent with the
underlying story upon which Revlon is built—that M&A transactions are fraught
with conflicts of interest, and therefore the process must be carefully regulated to
ensure that conflicted CEOs and board members act in the shareholders’ interests.
Tables 5 and 6 take a similar approach to Table 4, attempting to explain the
determinants of the key deal-process variables that, as we saw in Table 3, are affected
by Revlon mode. In other words, in Table 3, we saw that Revlon mode seems to affect
certain aspects of the deal process. In Tables 4–6, we are trying to see what factors,
in addition to Revlon, might explain the variation we see in deal processes.

140. See supra Section II.A.
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Table 5: Determinants of Number of Contacts

Dependent Variable = Number of Total Contacts
Determinant

Coeff.

P-value

Revlon Mode

-0.0218

0.905

Passive Market Check

-11.37

0.0000

Target Initiated First Contact

1.685

0.381

CEO Chairman

-0.4442

0.796

CEO Stock Option Ownership

0.0000

0.160

***

Years to Retirement
N = 276
Adjusted R-squared = 0.0685
Regression’s P-value = 0.0004
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.

Table 5 considers the factors that explain the variation in the number of contacts
the target has with bidders, and Table 6 examines the determinants of the number of
bids the target receives. In Table 5, the only statistically significant variable that
explains the variation in the number of contacts the target has with potential bidders
is whether or not the target pursues an active or passive market check. Specifically,
an active market check is associated with a greater number of contacts with potential
bidders. Table 6 demonstrates that the more contacts a target has with potential
bidders, the more bids it receives.
Table 6: Determinants of Number of Bids
Dependent Variable = Number of Bids
Determinant

Coeff.

P-value

Revlon Mode

0.2829

0.1611

Passive Market Check

-0.1407

0.5140

Target Initiated First Contact

0.6135

0.0043

***

Total Number of Contacts

0.0918

0.0000

***

CEO Chairman

0.2411

0.2058

CEO Stock Option Ownership

-0.0000

0.2754

Years to Retirement

0.0028

0.8508

N = 278
Adjusted R-squared = 0.4878
Regression’s P-value = 0.0000
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.

The story that emerges from Tables 4–6 is this: Revlon mode makes it more likely
that targets will adopt an active pre-signing market check. And an active pre-signing
market check is correlated with a greater number of contacts with potential bidders
and a greater number of bids. All of this is consistent with Prediction 1.
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But this only raises the question: Do any of these things actually matter in terms
of shareholder value? Revlon is intended to maximize short-term shareholder value.
But it is conceivable that Revlon could affect the deal process, as evidenced by the
results above, without actually affecting the price that shareholders ultimately get or
the market value of the final deal. In other words, does Revlon have the effect that is
intended? According to Prediction 2, the answer is a resounding “no,” since Revlon,
despite its early billing as an auctioneering duty,141 really does not operate in that
way. As long as a target board follows the preferred Revlon process—which is
typically an active pre-signing market check combined with a reasonable breakup
fee and a fiduciary out—they have considerable latitude in choosing among the
merger partners that result from that process.142 For this reason, Prediction 2 predicts
that Revlon mode has no effect on the price that target shareholders get or the way
the market responds to the announced deal.
To test this prediction, I run a regression of the deal-process variables on two
different dependent variables: abnormal market returns upon deal announcement and
the premium the deal price represents over market. Thus, the independent variables
of interest are the variables relating to whether the deal triggers Revlon (“Revlon”),
whether the target pursued an active or passive pre-signing market check (“Passive
Market Check”), the number of contacts the target had with potential bidders
(“Number of Contacts”) and the number of bids the target received (“Bids”). The
control variables include controls for different M&A agreement provisions, target
characteristics, deal characteristics, and conflict of interest proxies, all of which are
defined in Table 1. This model is very similar to others in the M&A literature, with
the exception that in this case I am adding deal-process variables and controls for
relevant M&A agreement provisions.143 The results of these regressions are set forth
in Table 7.
The first thing to note is that the estimates for several of the control variables in
Table 7 are consistent with the existing M&A literature. For example, I find that the
merger premium is lower in deals where the acquiror and target are in the same
industry.144 I also find that the market abnormal returns for the target’s stock are
increasing with the target’s leverage145 and that these returns are decreasing in deals
involving a merger of equals146 as well as in the target’s size as measured by assets.147
Other studies show that the Merger Premium is higher where there is a breakup fee.148
The coefficient on our Pro-Acquiror Breakup Fee variable in Table 7 is negative and
statistically significant for the regression, where the dependent variable is the Merger

141. See supra text accompanying note 112.
142. See supra text accompanying note 120.
143. See, e.g., Fich et al., supra note 125, at 348.
144. Id. However, it should be noted that their coefficient is not statistically significant.
145. Id. Although note that their dependent variable is a measure of deal premium, not
abnormal market returns.
146. See, e.g., Cong Wang & Fei Xie, Corporate Governance Transfer and Synergistic
Gains from Mergers and Acquisitions, 22 REV. FIN. STUDS. 829, 843 (2009); Fich et al., supra
note 125, at 348, 351 (finding this result for the premium variable and the combined CARS
variable—the study does not ever test the target’s CARs alone).
147. See, e.g., Fich et al., supra note 125, at 348.
148. See, e.g., Bates & Lemmon, supra note 100, at 493; Officer, supra note 100, at 431.

458

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 96:429

Premium. This means that shareholders experience negative wealth effects (in terms
of market abnormal returns and merger premia) the greater the breakup fee, relative
to the sample average of 3%. However, this finding is not necessarily inconsistent
with the result in the M&A literature that the Merger Premium is increasing in the
size of the breakup fee. In fact, this result is consistent with the intuition that a
reasonable breakup fee is efficient (because although it might ward off competing
bids, it also attracts bidders), but, at some point, it turns inefficient.
The results also provide some evidence that target firms trade off merger premia
in exchange for post-deal employment for the CEO. In regression (2), the coefficient
on the variable indicating whether the target CEO receives a Post-Deal Prestige
Job—chairman of the board, CEO of the combined company, or CEO of a subsidiary
of the combined company—is negative. In other words, the Merger Premium tends
to be lower where the CEO is to gain a prestigious post-deal job. This result is
consistent with the literature.149 It is also consistent with the assumption underlying
Revlon: that the takeover context gives rise to inherent conflicts of interest.
The fact that the estimates for these control variables are either consistent with
the literature or consistent with intuition should give us increased confidence in the
estimates for our variables of interest, which are the deal-process variables—namely,
Revlon, Passive Market Check, Bids, and Number of Contacts. The first thing to note
about Table 7 is that the estimate for the Revlon variable is positive and statistically
significant in both of the regressions. That is to say, market returns and deal premia
are higher when the target is in Revlon mode, everything else equal.
At first blush, this would seem to provide evidence that Prediction 2 is false; in
other words, it might appear based on these results that Revlon actually does increase
shareholder wealth. And indeed, this might be how one interprets other studies that
report similar findings.150 However, one of the main goals of the present study is to
try to control for the specific deal process that Revlon calls for, something other
studies have not done. Once we control for the deal process, the Revlon variable is
really just a proxy for whether the deal is primarily a cash deal or not.151 Thus, a
correct interpretation of the Revlon variable is that market returns and deal premia
are greater in cash deals. Once again, this is a well-established result in the M&A
literature.152 Many have speculated about why this might be the case, and there is
some evidence that cash deals act as a signal to the market that the target is
undervalued.153 However, the effect of cash consideration on market abnormal
returns or merger premia does not really tell us anything about whether Revlon affects
shareholder wealth. In other words, once we control for deal process, the Revlon
variable does not tell us much, if anything, about Prediction 2.

149. See, e.g., Jay C. Hartzell, Eli Ofek & David Yermack, What’s In It For Me? CEOs
Whose Firms Are Acquired, 17 REV. FIN. STUDS. 37, 52–53 (2004).
150. See supra notes 125–34 and accompanying text.
151. To be sure, the Revlon variable also seeks to capture control transactions. But as
explained earlier, the vast majority of the deals captured by this variable are non-control cash
deals, where a cash deal is defined as 50% cash or more. See supra notes 128–35 and
accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 125–34 and accompanying text.
153. See, e.g., Malmendier et al., supra note 125, at 92.
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Nevertheless, one might reasonably question whether this interpretation of the
Revlon variable is actually correct. One might entertain such a thought—particularly
if one thinks that Revlon duties are not just process-oriented but still retain some
substantive bite. This would be true, for example, if Revlon really did meaningfully
constrain the target board’s choice of merger partner from among the bidders
generated by the Revlon process. In other words, it could be true that our Revlon
variable continues to capture some effect of the Revlon doctrine (despite controlling
for the Revlon process) if, for example, pursuant to the original conception of the
“auctioneering duty,” the target board really did have to choose the highest bidder. I
argued in Part I that this is not how the modern application of Revlon works in
practice.
But one might be skeptical of such a claim. For that reason, I include in the model
in Table 7 the interaction variable “Bids*Revlon.” The estimate of this variable
should be interpreted as the effect the number of bids has on market returns and
merger premia when the target is in Revlon mode. If Revlon retains some substantive
bite above and beyond its effect on the deal process, one would expect the coefficient
on this interaction variable to be positive and statistically significant. However, it is
neither of these. This result is thus consistent with the view, expressed in Part I, that
Revlon lacks much, if any, substantive bite. Although Revlon affects the sales process
the target board undertakes, it does not affect how a target ultimately decides among
the choices the process generates. In other words, the effect that the number of bids
has on market returns and deal premia is no different in Revlon mode than outside of
Revlon mode, and outside of Revlon mode, the standard is the business judgment
rule, which is highly deferential to the target board’s decision. The interaction
variable’s lack of statistical significance indicates that courts are similarly deferential
to the target board’s decision as to a merger partner, even within Revlon mode. And
for this reason, it is reasonable to interpret the Revlon variable as a proxy for whether
the deal is for cash or stock.
To be clear, however, the fact that Revlon lacks substantive bite, consistent with
our review of the case law in Part I and the lack of statistical significance of the
interaction variable in Table 7, does not in and of itself mean that Revlon has no
effect on shareholder wealth. After all, it has already been shown that Revlon has real
effects on the sales process, and the sales process itself could affect shareholder
wealth even though Revlon does not appear to require the board to decide among the
results of that process any differently than outside of Revlon. In other words, even
though the interaction variable might not be statistically significant, it still might be
the case that market returns and premia are higher the more bids the target attracts.
And, if as has already been shown, Revlon affects the number of bids through its
preference for an active pre-market check, then it could still be the case that Revlon
affects shareholder wealth. However, as one can see from Table 7, besides one
exception, none of the estimates for any of the deal-process variables, other than the
Revlon variable itself, are statistically significant. Put differently, this is evidence that
deal process does not matter for shareholder wealth, whether one is in Revlon mode
or not.154

154. The one exception is the estimate for the variable relating to the Total Number of
Contacts. This estimate is negative and statistically significant for regression (1) involving the
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Table 7: Determinants of Short-Term Shareholder Returns
Regression:
Dependent Variable:

(1)
CAR (-1, +1)
Coeff. P-value

(2)
Premium
Coeff. P-value

Deal Process Characteristics
Bids -0.0005 0.9654
-0.0375 0.7845
Revlon 0.1425
0.0002 *** 0.0922
0.0797
*
Bids*Revlon -0.0079 0.5016
0.0089
0.5867
Passive Market Check 0.0138
0.5930
0.0252
0.4896
# Total Contacts -0.0020 0.0722
*
-0.0011 0.4528
Conflict of Interest Variables
CEO Chairman 0.0248
0.2962
0.0210
0.5282
Years to Retirement 0.0013
0.4858
0.0007
0.7918
Post-Deal Director Only -0.0584 0.1561
-0.0705 0.2246
Post-Deal Prestige Job -0.0296 0.2307
-0.0842 0.0164
**
Side Payment 0.0245
0.4112
0.0087
0.8346
M&A Agreement Data
Pro Acquiror Fiduciary Out 0.0233
0.7324
0.1655
0.1016
Pro Acquiror Breakup Fee -0.0393 0.0564
-0.0482 0.0928
*
Pro Acquiror No Go-Shop -0.0237 0.6479
0.0652
0.3830
Days to Match 0.0102
0.2290
0.0179
0.1698
Target Characteristics
Size -0.0001 0.0000 *** -0.0001 0.1342
Leverage 0.0962
0.0914
*
0.2929
0.0005 ***
M/B 0.0002
0.6573
-0.0005 0.5410
OCF -0.0072 0.9215
0.4630
0.6532
Deal Characteristics
Tender Offer 0.0189
0.5435
0.3572
0.4153
Same Industry -0.0368 0.1107
-0.0724 0.0253
**
Merger of Equals -0.1246 0.1000
*
0.0356
0.7402
N=
241
235
Adjusted R-squared =
0.19
0.09
Regression’s P-value = 0.0000
0.0036
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.

market-returns variables, but not statistically significant for regression (2) involving the deal
premium dependent variable. This estimate seems to show that market returns are actually
lower the more potential bidders a target talks to, with no effect on the deal premium. How
might we explain this? One possibility is that targets who know that a sale will be relatively
unpopular to shareholders, perhaps because shareholders believe that the target is currently
undervalued by the market, intentionally talk to more potential bidders in an effort to placate
the shareholders. This then allows them to better defend the sale in their SEC disclosure by
touting the number of potential bidders contacted. This Article does not explore in any detail
whether this hypothesis is true because it seems, at best, tangential to the current inquiry.
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D. Objections and Extensions
One potential objection to Table 7 might be that in our second regression
equation—where the dependent variable is the market premium—there is an
endogeneity problem since the market premium and the deal process variables are
jointly determined. In other words, the deal process affects the price, but it is also
affected by price, in which case the estimates of our deal process variables are
unreliable. However, the first equation—where the dependent variable is market
returns—acts as a control for endogeneity, since the market reaction is not
determined until after the deal process has been put into effect.155 The fact that the
first equation’s result confirms the results of the second equation serves as a
robustness check.
Another potential objection to the foregoing empirical results is that my focus on
deal process ignores the potential effect that Revlon has on effort. After all, one factor
that courts often take into consideration in analyzing a board’s compliance with their
Revlon duties is how “hard” the target board negotiated.156 This effort variable could
be measured by the number of counteroffers that are made with the winning bidder
or the difference between the winning bidder’s opening and ending bids. It is entirely
possible that the picture painted here is true: Revlon affects certain aspects of the deal
process, but those aspects do not affect shareholder returns, and, at the same time,
Revlon increases shareholder returns through its effect on how hard target boards
negotiate.
In fact, based on the evidence presented here, this result is not only possible but
likely. After all, it seems likely that Revlon affects how hard target boards negotiate
since it affects all other aspects of deal process that are a focus of the present study.
There seems to be little question that the Delaware courts, as well as deal lawyers
representing target boards, do a good job of communicating to boards the need to
follow a particular process when in Revlon mode.157 And there is no reason to believe
that Revlon’s insistence on “hard negotiating” would be any different.

155. In a contemporaneous paper, Matt Cain, Steven Davidoff Solomon, and their coauthors find that whether a company is in Revlon mode is correlated with higher premiums.
Cain et al., supra note 132. Contrary to the approach taken here, they do not re-run their
regression with market returns as the dependent variable. Id. Instead, they attempt to solve the
endogeneity problem by running the same regressions in states other than Delaware. Id. They
find that Revlon mode is not associated with higher premiums in these non-Delaware states, a
finding that they regard as evidence that it is really the peculiarities of Delaware law that
accounts for their results and not something else, like the possibility that higher premiums are
also associated with cash deals irrespective of the law. Id. This is an interesting result, but it
is also somewhat puzzling since, as others have noted, many non-Delaware states adopt Revlon
as their law, including particularly significant ones like California. See, e.g., Michal Barzuza,
The State of State Antitakeover Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 1973, 2012 (2009). For these reasons,
among others, I tend to view their different results as having less to do with better endogeneity
controls and more to do with the date range of their data set, which takes into account the early
2000s merger boom when Revlon likely worked differently and had more substantive bite than
after 2009, the period focused on here. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
157. Letter from J. Anthony Terrell, Att’y, Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman LLP, to
Clients and Friends (May 11, 2016), https://www.pillsburylaw.com/images/content/1/0

462

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 96:429

Additionally, unlike the other deal process variables focused on here, “negotiating
effort” is not as affected by the relatively recent Revlon cases, like In re Family
Dollar Stores, Inc. Stockholder Litigation158 and C&J Energy Services,159 which
have arguably defanged much of the substantive and procedural bite of the earlier
incarnations of the Revlon doctrine. By clarifying that Revlon does not require the
target board to choose, or even negotiate with, the highest bidder, Family Dollar
weakened Revlon’s substantive bite.160 By holding that Revlon does not require any
sort of active solicitation, even if the target board’s knowledge of the market is less
than “impeccable,” C&J Energy Services weakened Revlon’s procedural bite.161
Together, these developments give reason to question whether the deal process
variables included in the foregoing regressions will ultimately affect shareholder
returns. Even if a target board adopts an active solicitation process, Family Dollar
gives them considerable latitude to partner with their preferred bidder.162
However, this is not the case with respect to “negotiating effort.” There is no
reason to believe that cases like these would affect a board’s negotiating effort.
Furthermore, it stands to reason that the harder a board negotiates with the winning
bidder, the higher the price will be, assuming that it does not negotiate too hard and
chase the bidder away. Thus, it is also reasonable to assume that measures of
shareholder return, including abnormal market returns upon deal announcement and
deal premia, will be increasing with negotiating effort. For these reasons, Revlon
likely affects how hard a target board negotiates, and negotiating effort is likely
associated with higher shareholder returns.
However, even if this is true, the overall picture that this study paints of Revlon’s
effect on deal process would remain intact. Even if the Court’s modern Revlon
jurisprudence does not diminish a target board’s negotiating effort when in Revlon
mode, it allows the target board to decide with which bidders to apply such effort.
And that decision could be motivated by conflicts of interest that courts applying
Revlon typically ignore, things like side payments and post-deal employment. For
this reason, the failure to include a measure of negotiating effort does not affect the
overall thrust of this Article, which is the need to re-orient the Revlon doctrine around
the original conflicts of interest rationale that motivated the doctrine in the first place.
This is the topic of the next Part.
III. POLICY DISCUSSION
The empirical results confirm our hypothesis that Revlon duties do not really
matter for shareholder value. To be sure, these results confirm that Revlon affects
deal process in all of the ways one would expect: it increases the use of active presigning market checks, it increases the number of potential acquirors the target talks
to, and it increases the number of bids received. Nevertheless, these aspects of the
deal process do not ultimately appear to affect the premium received by target

/104200.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y96W-W8YS].
158. No. 9985-CB, 2014 WL 7246436 (Del. Ch. Dec. 19, 2014).
159. 107 A.3d 1049 (Del. 2014).
160. See 2014 WL 7246436, at *16.
161. 107 A.3d at 1069.
162. See 2014 WL 7246436, at *23.
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shareholders or the value that the market places on the deal. The reason for these
phenomena most likely has to do with the fact that, despite the stated reasons
underlying Revlon’s heightened standard of review, Revlon duties are not effectively
designed to address conflicts of interest.
A. Revlon’s Lack of Fit Between Problem and Solution
Although there might not be a single blueprint for Revlon, as we have seen, there
are certain blueprints that are more likely to pass muster than others. For example, a
target firm that adopts an active pre- or post-signing market check combined with a
fiduciary out and termination fee in the 3% range will almost certainly satisfy Revlon.
And yet, on reflection, this description of what Revlon requires should be a little
puzzling. After all, it does not seem that Revlon duties are particularly well tailored
to the problem at the heart of Revlon, which, as discussed in Part I, is the conflicts of
interest inherent in the sale decision.
There are generally two ways of solving conflict of interest problems. First, one
can try to neutralize the conflicts. For example, a conflicted officer or director could
recuse herself from the board’s decision-making with respect to the issue that
presents the conflict in the first instance. Second, one could introduce another layer
of substantive review by an objective arbiter, for example a court, board, or the
shareholders, to review a conflicted decision that has already taken place. This twoprong approach is how Delaware courts treat typical conflict of interest issues under
the duty of loyalty.163 If the board that authorizes the conflicted transaction is
conflict-free because any conflicted directors have recused themselves from the
decision-making, then the board’s decision is subject to the highly deferential
business judgment standard. The same is true if the decision, though not free of
conflict, is ratified by a disinterested board or disinterested shareholders. Otherwise,
a court will review the substantive and procedural fairness of the decision.
Revlon does not take this approach. Rather, Revlon has developed in such a way
that one might be forgiven for thinking that the problem it is trying to solve has less
to do with conflicts and more to do with a lack of care. To be clear, the Delaware
Chancery Court has clarified that “Revlon duties are only a specific application of
directors’ traditional fiduciary duties of care and loyalty in the context of control
transactions.”164 In other words, Revlon has to do with both care and loyalty. This
makes sense because conflicts of interest can cause a lack of care. For example, a
chairman who is offered a lucrative post-deal consulting position by a bidder might
be induced to adopt a less than thorough process in order to justify accepting the
bidder’s offer. Thus, there is little question that the duty of care is relevant to Revlon.
But the point is that at bottom, the concern is one of a conflict of interest.165

163. See, e.g., In re Pilgrim’s Pride Corp. Deriv. Litig., 2019 WL 1224556, at *15 (Del.
Ch. Mar. 15, 2019) (“A director can avoid liability for interested transaction by totally
abstaining from any participation in the transaction”); Benihana of Tokyo, Inc. v. Benihana,
Inc., 906 A.2d 114, 120-21 (explaining that when a conflicted transaction is approved by
disinterested directors the court is to defer to the board under the business judgment rule).
164. Dent v. Ramtron Int’l Corp., No. 7950-VCP, 2014 WL 2931180, at *5 (Del. Ch. June
30, 2014).
165. This suggests that liability under Revlon should never be exculpable under a Delaware
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If Revlon was solely about a lack of care, then Revlon’s solution—mandating
certain procedural features—would make sense. But that only works if we think that
the fiduciaries are simply shirking rather than acting out of self-interest. If the
problem is really one of a conflict of interest, then that problem is still going to be
there no matter how much process is layered on.
For example, consider a situation where the CEO’s wife, a well-known opera
singer, is being considered by the company to headline a new opera-themed
marketing campaign.166 The typical way to deal with that conflict of interest would
be either to require the CEO to recuse himself from the board’s decision-making or
to have a court determine whether the deal with the CEO’s wife is entirely fair. It
would not do to simply add additional process—for example, requiring the board to
canvas the market for opera singers if, at the end of that canvassing, the board could
give in to the conflicts and hire the CEO’s wife without having to defend the
substantive fairness of that decision. And yet, that is effectively what Revlon
requires.
The odd fit between the conflicts of interest that Revlon seemingly intended to
address and the process that it requires implies that a conflicted target board could
effectively select the bidder toward which its conflicts prejudice it as long as the
target board simply checks the relevant Revlon process boxes. In other words, one
legitimate concern with Revlon is that it does not mitigate but instead exacerbates the
conflict of interest problem by creating a process-based safe harbor that does not in
itself prevent the conflicts that risk prejudicing the board’s decision.
The empirical evidence reported in Part II is consistent with this story.
B. Policy Choices: More Robust Conflict Review, More Shareholder Disclosure
1. More Robust Analysis of Target Board Conflicts
The policy options basically follow from the two-pronged framework Delaware
adopts for dealing with conflicts of interest, as reviewed above. First, consistent with
Delaware’s approach to conflicts of interest, one could focus on neutralizing the
conflict at issue. If the choice of merger partner is made by a disinterested board and
the deal process looks reasonable, then courts should defer to that decision. Indeed,
the Delaware courts already understand themselves to be doing something precisely
along these lines in the Revlon context. For example, in Family Dollar,167 the
Delaware Chancery Court observed that “when the record reveals no basis to
question a board’s motivations, the Court understandably will be more likely to defer

Code § 102(b)(7) provision. Yet, courts do not typically analyze Revlon claims by assuming
that at bottom, if Revlon applies, it is because of a conflict of interest. Rather, they view it in
terms of the reasonableness of the target board’s actions. And thus, the question is whether the
board acted with a conscious disregard of their duties, in which case the duty of loyalty is
implicated. Otherwise, they dismiss the claim on account of the § 102(b)(7) provision. See,
e.g., Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 239–40 (Del. 2009).
166. This is an obvious allusion to the famous case of Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2 (N.Y.
1944).
167. 2014 WL 7246436.
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to the board’s judgment in determining how to conduct a corporate sale process.”168
However, there are at least two problems with the current approach. First, the
evidence in Part II does not imply that process does not matter at all. Rather, it
implies that a particular sales process is not a sufficient condition for maximizing
short-term shareholder returns, particularly if the courts are not going to police how
target firms select among the bidders generated by that process.169 However, process
still matters. Courts are never going to be able to perfectly identify when a board is
completely free of conflicts because some conflicts are not readily identifiable. The
process a board chooses, however, can be indirect evidence of conflicts. Specifically,
the choice of an entirely passive sales process when the board lacks considerable
knowledge of the market should constitute such indirect evidence of a conflict of
interest. For this reason, I view C&J Energy Services as a mistake to the extent that
it overturns Barkan and its progeny’s presumption in favor of an active solicitation
process unless the target board has “impeccable knowledge” of the market.170
However, even with a good sales approach, there might be lurking conflicts of
interest that prevent the target board from selecting the bidder that would maximize
shareholder returns, and it is not clear that the courts always engage in a sufficiently
robust conflicts review. This is the second problem with the current approach courts
take with respect to Revlon. As a general matter, courts apply different levels of
scrutiny when analyzing board conflicts, and they often do so without explaining
why. Take, for example, the context of the special litigation committee, the board
committee established to determine whether the corporation should cause a
shareholder derivative lawsuit to be dismissed. In a case like the well-known
Auerbach v. Bennett,171 the court deemed the committee disinterested because its
directors were not board members at the time of the transaction that gave rise to the
underlying lawsuit.172 Yet, in a case like In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litigation,173
this same fact did nothing to prevent the court from concluding, after a much more
searching review, that the committee was conflicted.174 In the Revlon context,
Delaware courts generally seem to prefer a very light sort of Auerbach review,
whereas it would be more consistent with the origins of Revlon to perform the type
of searching review one sees in In re Oracle.
To illustrate, consider the Family Dollar case.175 Family Dollar entered into a
merger agreement with Dollar Tree at a price of $74.50 in cash and stock.176 It did
so at a time when it was in ongoing negotiations with a different bidder, Dollar

168. Id. at *12.
169. I’m not suggesting that the courts should, but they’ve made it pretty clear that they
will not. See id.
170. See C&J Energy Servs., Inc. v. City of Miami Gen. Emps.’ & Sanitation Emps.’ Ret.
Tr., 107 A.3d 1049, 1068–71 (Del. 2014); see also In re OPENLANE, Inc. S’holders Litig.,
No. 6849-VCN, 2011 WL 4599662, at *5 (Del. Ch. Sept. 30, 2011).
171. 303 N.E.2d 994 (N.Y. 1979).
172. See id. at 997.
173. 824 A.2d 917 (Del. Ch. 2003).
174. See id. at 929.
175. In re Family Dollar Stores, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 9985-CB, 2014 WL 7246436
(Del. Ch. Dec. 19, 2014).
176. Id. at *1.
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General, which seemed “anxious to do a transaction” but who was never informed
of the discussions between Family Dollar and Dollar Tree because of a nondisclosure agreement between those two parties.177 Shortly after the deal between
Family Dollar and Dollar Tree was announced, Dollar General made a bid of $80 per
share in cash, which the Family Dollar board rejected.178 In the subsequent lawsuit,
where Dollar General alleged a Revlon claim, the court determined that the Family
Dollar board was not conflicted because the majority of the board consisted of
outside directors and many of them had a lot of stock in the company.179 After the
lawsuit, Family Dollar had to adjourn its shareholders meeting because it did not
have sufficient support among its shareholders to ensure approval of the merger with
Dollar Tree because of the possibility of Dollar General’s higher bid.180
Thus, the Family Dollar court’s conflicts review largely focused on whether the
board consisted of outside directors or not.181 However, the types of concerns over
conflicts that animate Revlon could occur even on a board consisting of a majority
of outside directors and even among those with a lot of money on the line. In fact,
the plaintiffs in Family Dollar made allegations of such conflicts, arguing that
Howard Levine, the chairman of the company and son of its founder, who was
charged with negotiating the deal, preferred the Dollar Tree deal because of an
expressed desire to be part of the combined company and because of Dollar Tree’s
apparent willingness to keep the company headquarters in its current location in
North Carolina.182 However, the court gave these arguments short shrift, viewing
them as mere negotiating tactics that did not reflect Levine’s true views.183 One piece
of evidence in support of the view that headquarters location was an important
consideration in the choice of bidder was an email sent to Levine by one of his
directors, who also happened to be North Carolina’s Secretary of Commerce, in
which she expressed her conditional support for the deal as long as the headquarters
remained in North Carolina.184 The court treated this email from a person whose
elected position required her to advocate for North Carolina’s business interests as
an obvious joke since the email ended with a smiley face.185
The Delaware Supreme Court’s approach to board conflicts in C&J Energy
Services186 was similarly limited but perhaps even more revealing. There, then-Chief
Justice Strine suggested that the benchmark for a conflicts analysis should come from
the facts of Revlon itself, which involved “a decision by a board of directors to chill
the emergence of a higher offer from a bidder because the board’s CEO disliked the

177. Id. at *3–4.
178. Id. at *9–10.
179. Id. at *13.
180. Family Dollar Adjourns Shareholder Meeting On Dollar Tree Deal, REUTERS (Dec.
23, 2014), https://www.businessinsider.com/r-family-dollar-adjourns-shareholder-meetingon-dollar-tree-deal-2014-12 [https://perma.cc/9L7Y-RR2Y].
181. Family Dollar, 2014 WL 7246436, at *13.
182. Id. at *2, *13.
183. Id. at *13.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. C&J Energy Servs., Inc. v. City of Miami Gen. Emps.’ & Sanitation Emps.’ Ret. Tr.,
107 A.3d 1049 (Del. 2014).
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new bidder.”187 Short of that type of conflict, the Chief Justice implied, the board
should be deemed independent, as the court found in C&J Energy Services.188
This approach strikes me as taking too narrow a view of potential board conflicts,
particularly in light of the concerns underlying Revlon. Those concerns were not
simply that the target CEO might not like the CEO of one of the bidders, which seems
like a rather unusual conflict actually. The more common source of conflict, one
would think, derives from interests that the CEO, chairman, or whoever is leading
the negotiation on the part of the target has in the merger. Accordingly, a more robust
analysis of target board conflicts in this context would consider a number of different
factors, including how the deal process was decided; whether it was influenced by
the person who was negotiating with the bidder on behalf of the target; whether that
negotiator, or anyone else involved in the decision, had anything to gain from going
with one particular bidder over another; and whether that potential conflict
materialized at a point during the course of negotiations that it could have influenced
the ultimate outcome. For example, one could imagine a scenario where the CEO,
who negotiated the deal, is to receive a “transaction bonus” from the bidder but that
the bonus was not broached by the bidder until after the board had already selected
that bidder for other reasons.
Finally, the C&J Energy Services court’s conflicts review was lacking in a
different respect. It failed to acknowledge what was implicit in the lower court
opinion—the target board’s lax sales process itself raised the specter of conflicts even
if no obvious conflicts could be identified.189 This was the wisdom of the Barkan
court’s strong preference for an active sales process with only a very limited
exception for situations where the target board already had a high degree of
knowledge about the market.190 We would do well to return to that Barkan standard
while engaging in a more searching conflict review than the ones we see in either
Family Dollar or C&J Energy Services.
2. More Shareholder Disclosure
In the Delaware approach to conflicts, an alternative to neutralizing the conflict
would be to have the conflicted transaction ratified by a fully informed disinterested
party, like shareholders. This appears to be the approach recently taken in Corwin v.
KKR Financial Holdings LLC, where the Delaware Supreme Court held that the
business judgment rule—and not Revlon’s heightened standard—is the appropriate
standard of review in a post-closing damages suit involving a merger that has been
approved by a fully informed, uncoerced majority of disinterested shareholders.191 In
other words, according to the Corwin court, the target shareholder vote, which is
required by the Delaware corporate law statute, can also serve to ratify any lapse
under Revlon.192 This raises a number of issues, for example, the possibility that the

187. Id. at 1067.
188. Id. (opining that understanding the nature of this conflict in Revlon is important to
understanding the case and everything that has come after it).
189. Id. at 1052–53.
190. Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286–87 (Del. 1989).
191. 125 A.3d 304, 306, 308 (Del. 2015).
192. Id. at 308.
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choice given to shareholders might be distorted particularly in situations where the
board had little time to pursue other potential bidders.193 Although these types of
concerns are always present when it comes to shareholder ratification of board
conduct, they might be of heightened relevance in this context.
However, another issue is one of information. In determining whether to accept
the bird in the hand over the one in the bush, shareholders need to know whether the
board’s decision to accept the acquiror’s offer is free of conflict. Current securities
disclosure rules are not as clear as they might be on that score. True, federal securities
laws require the target to disclose any interests that the directors or officers might
have in the merger.194 However, no disclosure is required if the interest has not yet
materialized, and therefore acquirors can get around these disclosures with a wink
and a nod, promising the chairman or CEO a transaction bonus or some other type
of merger side payment but not before the proxy statement goes out. For example,
disclosures sometimes identify a pool of money that is to be paid out in transaction
bonuses but has not been distributed by the time the proxy statement is circulated.
Consequently, there is no way of knowing whether the person who negotiated the
deal is included among the potential recipients of that money. Disclosure of any
expectations of side payments would help address this issue.
Additionally, merger side payments are not necessarily always bad. They might,
for example, be necessary in order to persuade a reluctant CEO to relinquish the reins
of the company and his position, along with the accompanying perks, to a more
efficient acquiror. In this sense, merger side payments can be a way of addressing
deficiencies in the structure of a CEO’s golden parachute compensation. There is
even some evidence to this effect.195 For this reason, it would be useful to include in
the disclosure the reason for any merger-related side payment.
Post-deal employment is another issue. Like merger side payments, the fact that
the CEO, chairman, or other officers of the target will be employed by the acquiror
in some respect following the transaction is not in and of itself a bad thing. Some
acquirors, like Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway, pride themselves on making
very few, if any, governance changes post-acquisition, including keeping CEOs at
the helm.196 Sometimes the CEO or chairman is central to the value proposition the
acquiror sees in the target. Other times, post-deal employment is simply a carrot
extended to the CEO or chairman to accept that particular acquiror’s bid.
Two potential disclosure rules could help address these concerns. First, the target
should have to disclose at what point during the negotiations the lead negotiator on
behalf of the board discovered that he or she might be offered a position in the
combined company. Some boards are careful to try to reserve any such discussions
until after the bid has been accepted. But this does not happen all of the time. Second,

193. See, e.g., Cox & Thomas, supra note 73, at 340.
194. See Information Required in Proxy Statement, 17 C.F.R. §240.14a-101, Item 5
(2018).
195. See, e.g., Fich et al., supra note 125, at 340 (“Our evidence is consistent with the view
that a merger bonus is typically used to mitigate conflicts of interest between target CEOs and
their shareholders.”).
196. Shana Lynch, What Is It Like to Be Owned by Warren Buffet?, INSIGHTS BY STANFORD
BUS. (Oct. 29, 2015), https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/insights/what-it-be-owned-warren-buffett
[https://perma.cc/QZK5-9KRB].
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the target should have to disclose the reason why the acquiror wants to retain the
CEO, chairman, or other person responsible for negotiating the deal on behalf of the
target; why those attributes are unique or could not be easily captured by someone
currently employed or otherwise known by the acquiror; and whether the acquiror
has a policy of retaining such persons and has done so with respect to other
acquisitions.
CONCLUSION
In this Article I have argued that, given the way the Revlon doctrine has developed
over time, one should not expect that Revlon achieves what it was originally designed
to achieve: maximizing short-term shareholder wealth. I have also presented
evidence supporting this argument. Finally, I have suggested that to fix Revlon, we
might bring the doctrine more in line with the way Delaware law typically addresses
conflict of interests: a more robust review of potential conflicts and greater disclosure
of such conflicts.
To be sure, I am not suggesting that such policy proposals, if adopted, would solve
the problem at the heart of Revlon. Conflicts of interest are complicated because they
are not unequivocally bad, and attempts to eradicate all conflicts, I suspect, would
do more harm than good. Nor do I think the theoretical and empirical criticisms of
Revlon presented here should cause one to conclude that the doctrine is completely
useless and could be scrapped without consequence. Just as we think that the
shareholder welfare maximization norm does not need to be enforced to be
valuable,197 the same might be true of Revlon. Nevertheless, the doctrine does not
appear to do what people assume it does. And that’s a fact that needs to be reckoned
with for the future of corporate law.

197. This would be the justification of famous cases like Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d
776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968), where the court extols the shareholder maximizing norm but then
applies a robust form of the business judgment rule.

